Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path by Traum, Anne R.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2011
Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own
Path
Anne R. Traum
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Immigration Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. For more information, please contact
david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Traum, Anne R., "Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path" (2011). Scholarly Works. Paper 684.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/684
TRAUM.33.2 12/19/2011 10:55 PM 
 
491 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING  
IMMIGRATION LAW ON ITS OWN PATH 
Anne R. Traum∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 
Courts should insist on heightened procedural protections in im-
migration adjudication. They should do so under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause rather than by importing Sixth Amendment protec-
tions from the criminal context. Traditional judicial oversight and the 
Due Process Clause provide a better basis than the Sixth Amendment to 
interpose heightened procedural protections in immigration proceed-
ings, especially those involving removal for a serious criminal convic-
tion. The Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence in recent years 
lends support for this approach. The Court has guarded the availability 
of judicial review of immigration decisions. It has affirmed that courts 
are the arbiters of constitutional issues (including due process) and 
criminal statutory interpretation. The Court has accorded agency defe-
rence on matters of agency expertise, which does not include interpreta-
tion of criminal law and convictions. And the Court has created gener-
ally applicable procedural protections in order to minimize court 
interference with substantive immigration policy. Guided by these core 
concepts, courts are poised to develop procedural protections for immi-
grants in removal proceedings that are tailored to the institutional in-
terests at stake and protective of immigrants. By constitutionalizing 
immigration on its own path, courts may also avoid some of the pitfalls 
of a Sixth Amendment–based criminal-rights model. 
 
 ∗  Associate Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. Dean 
John Valery White provided financial support for this project. I am grateful for the comments and 
encouragement of G. Jack Chin, Juliet Stumpf, Peter Markowitz, Lindsay Nash, David Thronson, 
Angela Morrison, Kate Kruse, Bret Birdsong, Rebecca Aviel, and Carolina Núñez, along with 
other participants in the Symposium, Innovative Approaches to Immigrant Representation: Ex-
ploring New Partnerships, and the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Forum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is wholly desirable and constitutionally appropriate for courts to 
impose procedural protections in immigration proceedings to avoid due 
process concerns and facilitate judicial review, but they should not rely 
on Sixth Amendment protections to do so. It is well settled that aliens in 
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removal proceedings are entitled to due process under the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution. Some immigration scholars and advo-
cates have argued that because immigration proceedings are sufficiently 
criminal in nature, immigrants, like defendants in criminal cases, should 
be afforded Sixth Amendment protections, especially the right to ap-
pointed counsel.1 Those favoring this Sixth Amendment approach may 
find a glimmer of hope in the Court’s recent decision in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky,2 in which it held that the defense counsel was deficient for failing 
to accurately advise the defendant about the certainty that he would be 
deported as a consequence of pleading guilty to a drug trafficking of-
fense.3 Padilla is a watershed decision because it recognizes that a de-
fendant’s failure to understand immigration consequences of his convic-
tion could render his guilty plea invalid. And Padilla does much to 
erase the Court’s rigid and historical classification of deportation as a 
civil, not a criminal, proceeding. By likening deportation to criminal 
punishment and bringing immigration consequences within the ambit of 
the defense counsel’s duty to the client, Padilla arguably lends support 
to the view that Sixth Amendment protections should be afforded to 
persons in removal proceedings. 
Despite the allure of the Sixth Amendment—especially because it 
offers the promise of a right to appointed counsel—courts should in-
stead tailor procedural protections to fit immigration law based on tradi-
tional judicial powers and due process concerns. In confirming and de-
veloping procedural protections in immigration law, the Sixth 
Amendment doctrine might serve as an important guidepost, but it may 
neither fit immigration proceedings nor sufficiently protect immigrants. 
Instead, courts should rely, as they have done historically, on the Due 
Process Clause and their traditional judicial review functions to ensure 
that immigration proceedings are fair, just, and sufficiently transparent 
to allow review.  
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court’s immigration jurispru-
dence has amplified several themes that are essential to this approach. 
The Court has guarded the availability of judicial review of immigration 
decisions. It has affirmed that courts are the arbiters of constitutional 
issues (including due process) and criminal statutory interpretation. The 
Court has accorded deference on matters of agency expertise, while 
identifying areas not within the agency’s expertise as within its own 
bailiwick. And it has created generally applicable procedural protections 
 
 1 Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Chal-
lenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011) (pro-
posing a right to deportation counsel based on the Sixth and Fifth Amendments). 
 2 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 3 Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011) (describ-
ing Padilla’s contribution to a “reconceptualization” of the nature of deportation and arguing in 
favor of right to counsel). 
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in order to minimize court interference with substantive immigration 
policy and law. Aided by these core concepts, courts are poised to de-
velop procedural protections for immigrants in removal proceedings 
that are tailored to the institutional interests at stake and protective of 
immigrants, who in many cases are facing permanent exile and the risk 
of harm upon return to their native land. Importantly, by constitutiona-
lizing immigration on its own path, courts may also avoid some of the 
pitfalls of adopting a Sixth Amendment–based criminal-rights model. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes some of the crim-
inal aspects of removal proceedings, focusing on the adjudication of 
“aggravated felony” convictions under immigration law. Part II identi-
fies several core features of a due process–based judicial review frame-
work that would support judicially imposed procedural protections for 
noncitizens in removal proceedings. Part III examines two important 
procedural protections in criminal law, namely, constitutional discovery 
and the right to counsel, and proposes how analogous protections might 
be interposed in immigration courts using the due process–based judi-
cial review framework. 
 
I.     CRIMINAL LAW IN IMMIGRATION COURT 
 
Developments over the past several decades have changed the fo-
cus of immigration law and the role of courts in reviewing immigration 
decisions. Immigration laws expanded the immigration consequences of 
criminal convictions and restricted judicial review of immigration deci-
sions. As a result, immigration courts are deeply involved in determin-
ing the immigration consequences of criminal convictions. At the same 
time, judicial review of immigration decisions has been limited or elim-
inated altogether. Coupled with stepped-up enforcement, greater num-
bers of immigrants are in removal proceedings than ever before,4 facing 
harsher conditions during removal proceedings and harsher conse-
quences as a result of the proceedings, with limited ability to seek judi-
cial review of the agency action. 
This Article focuses on removal proceedings for immigrants based 
on “aggravated felony” convictions, one of the centerpieces of immigra-
 
 4 In 1996, when Congress expanded the term “aggravated felony,” approximately 50,000 
noncitizens were removed, nearly 33,000 of them based on criminal conviction. IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SERVICE 173 (1997), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/
statyearbk96.zip. By contrast, in 2010, approximately 363,000 noncitizens were detained and 
387,000 noncitizens were removed, approximately 169,000 of them based on a criminal convic-
tion. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010 1 [hereinafter IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010], 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf. 
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tion enforcement. Though many grounds for deportation exist, removal 
based on prior criminal conviction is common and deportation based on 
an “aggravated felony” leads to automatic removal and permanent ex-
ile.5 Because the aggravated felony determination focuses on a criminal 
conviction and the stakes are so high, these removal proceedings may 
be the most comparable to criminal proceedings. This discussion con-
siders several aspects of these immigration proceedings, including the 
relationship to the underlying criminal conviction, the removal hearing 
environment, and the legal analysis immigration courts perform in de-
termining aggravated felonies. While immigration courts are steeped in 
criminal law issues in a criminal-like setting, their function and mission 
is distinct from criminal court proceedings: they have no institutional 
expertise in criminal law, do not make factual findings, and do not ad-
judicate guilt or sentencing enhancements. 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, criminal 
proceedings and immigration proceedings are integrally related.6 Critics 
have observed more broadly that the criminalization of immigration law 
has been asymmetric7: the government has increasingly relied on crimi-
nal statutes, criminal law enforcement tactics, and criminal and deporta-
tion penalties as immigration policy tools, but immigrants have not been 
accorded corresponding criminal procedural rights. Doctrinally, immi-
gration proceedings have historically been labeled by the Court as civil, 
not criminal.8 This classification is important because immigrants in 
removal proceedings do not have a right to appointed counsel or other 
procedural protections afforded criminal defendants under the Sixth 
Amendment.9 In practice, however, this distinction has become blurred 
as immigration has transformed criminal practice and criminal law is-
sues saturate immigration proceedings. In exploring the theoretical sup-
port for affording similar procedural rights in immigration court, it is 
helpful to examine the practical importance of procedural rights in the 
underlying criminal and subsequent removal proceedings. 
 
 5 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484. 
 6 Id. at 1482. 
 7 Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
135 n.1 (2009); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorpo-
ration of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Markowitz, supra note 
3, at 1339–47. 
 8 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1334; Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal 
Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceed-
ings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 298–307 (2008) (describing the Supreme Court’s treat-
ment of immigration as a civil, rather than criminal, matter). 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (referring to “all criminal prosecutions”); Kanstroom, supra note 
1, at 1501 (citing Charles Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. 
REV. 875, 875–76 (1961)) (explaining that the civil law label has precluded application of the 
Sixth Amendment to immigration proceedings). 
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A.     Immigration Consequences of Aggravated Felonies 
 
For nearly a century, immigration law has imposed the severe 
sanction of deportation for immigrants convicted of crimes on American 
soil.10 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 authorized deporta-
tion for commission of a felony “crime involving moral turpitude” with-
in five years of entry or two or more crimes involving moral turpitude 
any time after entry.11 As early as 1922, narcotics offenses were added 
as grounds for removal and treated as crimes involving moral turpi-
tude.12 The term “aggravated felony” was incorporated into the immi-
gration law in 1988 and is unique to the immigration code, as it is not 
used elsewhere in federal statutes.13 Initially, the term only included a 
handful of serious crimes, including murder and trafficking in drugs or 
guns.14 In 1990, Congress barred discretionary relief to any person con-
victed of an aggravated felony who had served at least five years in 
prison.15 
The definition of “aggravated felony” was greatly expanded in 
1996 with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penal-
ty Act (AEDPA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).16 These laws added many criminal con-
victions to the list of “aggravated felonies,” even including cases in 
which the court imposed a suspended sentence, requiring no service of 
jail or prison time.17 By expanding the list of deportable offenses, Con-
 
 10 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–79 (citing S. REP. NO. 1515, at 54–55 (1950)). 
 11 Id. at 1479. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010). 
 14 See Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7344, 102 Stat. 4182, 
4469–70 (amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101a), 1252(a)). 
 15 See INS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001) (citing Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 
4978, 5052 (1990) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c))). 
 16 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
tit. IV, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 
§ 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)). AEDPA became effective on 
April 24, 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214, and IIRIRA became effective on September 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 
at 3009-546. 
 17 Under present law, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011): 
The term “aggravated felony” means— 
(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; 
(B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 
21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18); 
(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921 
of Title 18) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title); 
(D) [money laundering, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957], if the amount of 
the funds exceeded $10,000; 
(E) [firearms and explosives offenses, described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 842(h–i); 844(d–
i); 922(g)(1–5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r); or 924(b), (h); 26 U.S.C. § 5861]; 
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gress created a much larger class of persons subject to removal based on 
criminal convictions.18 That same year, Congress also barred discretio-
nary relief for any person convicted of an aggravated felony, even if 
they received a suspended prison sentence.19 Today removal of “crimi-
 
(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a 
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment at least one year; 
(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for 
which the term of imprisonment at least one year; 
(H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of Title 18 (relating to 
the demand for or receipt of ransom); 
(I) [a child pornography offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2251A, or 
2252]; 
(J) [a racketeer-influenced-corrupt-organizations offense described in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1962, 1084 or 1955], for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more 
may be imposed; 
(K) [a prostitution or involuntary servitude offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2421, 2422, or 2423 or 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1585 or 1588–1591]; 
(L) a [spying offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 798, 2153, 2381 or 2382; or 
50 U.S.C. § 421]; 
(M) an offense that— 
(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000; or 
(ii) is described in section 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which 
the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000; 
(N) [an alien-smuggling offense described in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) or (a)(2)], 
except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown 
that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aid-
ing only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent . . . to violate a provision of this chap-
ter; 
(O) an [unlawful reentry] offense described in [8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a) or 1326]; 
(P) [a passport] offense in violation of [18 U.S.C. §§ 1543 or1546(a)] for which 
the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a first of-
fense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien [committed the 
offense intending to benefit the alien’s spouse, child, or parent]; 
(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sen-
tence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 
years or more; 
(R) [a vehicle theft or fraud offense] for which the term of imprisonment is at 
least one year; 
(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, 
or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; 
(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court or-
der to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years' 
imprisonment or more may be imposed; and 
(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph. 
The term applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Fed-
eral or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign 
country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 
years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the 
term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after Sep-
tember 30, 1996. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 18 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297 (citing 110 Stat. at 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c))). 
 19 IIRIRA repealed the broad discretionary relief previously available under § 212(c). See 
§ 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-597. The new law replaced discretionary relief with a provision that 
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nal aliens” is a central part of immigration enforcement and includes a 
large class of aggravated felons.20 
A determination in immigration court that an alien’s prior convic-
tion is an “aggravated felony”21 carries serious and lasting conse-
quences. An aggravated felon faces certain removal and is ineligible for 
release pending removal22 and discretionary relief from removal, such 
as “voluntary departure” or political asylum.23 An aggravated felon 
cannot lawfully return to the United States24 and will face criminal 
sanctions if found to have returned to this country, including significant 
sentencing enhancements based on the prior “aggravated felony” con-
viction.25 Whether a prior conviction is an aggravated felony is a purely 
legal issue that can involve complex statutory analysis of criminal laws 
and criminal records.26 The aggravated felony determination is made in 
the first instance by the immigration court and appealable to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the federal circuit court where the 
removal action was filed.27 Although courts generally lack jurisdiction 
to review an order of removal based on an aggravated felony convic-
tion, the propriety of the aggravated felony determination is a judicially 
 
authorizes the Attorney General to cancel removal for a narrow class of inadmissible or deporta-
ble aliens, but excludes any person “convicted of any aggravated felony.” See id. at 3009-594 
(adding section 240A to the Immigration and Nationality Act, tit. II, ch. 4) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b (2006)); id. § 1229b(a)(3). In Judulang v. Holder, appeal docketed, No. 10-694 (U.S. 
Nov. 29, 2010), the Supreme Court will address whether a lawful permanent resident who pre-
viously pled guilty to offenses that rendered him excludable and deportable, but who did not 
leave the country before the start of removal proceedings against him, may be granted discretio-
nary relief from deportation under former § 212(c). See Kevin Johnson, Argument Recap: Former 
Section 212(c) Relief from Removal for Lawful Permanent Residents Convicted of Aggravated 
Felonies, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/
argument-recap-judulang-v-holder-former-section-212c-relief-from-removal-for-lawful-
permanent-residents-convicted-of-aggravated-felonies. 
 20 See IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra note 4, at 1(noting that of the 
approximately 387,000 persons deported in 2010, 169,000 were “known criminal aliens”). 
 21 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011). 
 22 See id. § 1226(c) (requiring mandatory custody pending removal) and Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (discussing provisions requiring mandatory custody of aggravated felons 
and eliminating judicial review of custody decisions). 
 23 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b)(a)(3) (prohibiting cancellation of removal for persons convicted 
of an aggravated felony); id. § 1229(c)(a)(i) (aggravated felon ineligible for voluntary departure); 
id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (aggravated felon ineligible for asylum). 
 24 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (2006) (aggravated felons are “inadmissible”). 
 25 See id. § 1326 (criminalizing unlawful reentry by removed aliens); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (adding multiple-level sentencing enhancement for person com-
mitted of “aggravated felony,” as defined in the INA). If convicted, the noncitizen, aggravated 
felon first serves a criminal sentence before being deported again. 
 26 See, e.g., Nijawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (surveying state “fraud and deceit” 
statutes in effect in 1996, when Congress defined aggravated felony to include an offense that 
“involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” to help 
discern Congress’s intent in setting the threshold); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 nn.5–6 
(2004) (referring to thirty-six state statutes criminalizing injury caused by driver under the influ-
ence). 
 27 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
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reviewable legal issue.28 As discussed below, the aggravated felony 
determination may involve a detailed and technical analysis of a the 
prior conviction, the relevant state or federal statute of conviction, re-
lated case law, and the record of conviction from the state or federal 
court that adjudicated the conviction. 
 
B.     Padilla and the Criminal Process Before 
Removal Proceedings 
 
Though the aggravated felony determination is made in immigra-
tion court, the underlying conviction for it is established in criminal 
court. In the litigation continuum, a noncitizen moves from conviction 
in state or federal criminal court where he has the assistance of counsel 
and other criminal procedure rights, to removal proceedings in immigra-
tion court where he has no right to counsel and many fewer procedural 
protections. The Supreme Court held in Padilla that counsel in criminal 
cases have a duty to inform the defendant about whether his plea carries 
a risk of deportation.29 It is especially valuable for the noncitizen to get 
such advice in the criminal court record before or while the record is 
being made because that record of conviction forms the basis for the 
aggravated felony analysis in immigration court.30 As Padilla high-
lights, immigration law consequences can significantly impact the reso-
lution of the criminal case. 
As the Court in Padilla recognized, immigration consequences are 
an “integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part” of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants for a criminal 
conviction.31 The severe immigration consequences imposed on nonci-
tizens with prior convictions “have dramatically raised the stakes of 
noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”32 The Court explained that immigra-
tion consequences may be important to both sides in resolving a crimi-
nal case: because the “threat of deportation is a powerful incentive to 
plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in ex-
change for a dismissal that does,” both defense and prosecution may 
 
 28 See id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (providing that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final 
order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” an aggra-
vated felony or crime of moral turpitude); id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (preserving judicial review of 
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropri-
ate court of appeals in accordance with this section). 
 29 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). The Court remanded on the issue of 
prejudice. Id. at 1487. 
 30 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (describing documents used to prove prior convictions). 
 31 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. 
 32 Id. 
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benefit by “[b]ringing deportation consequences into this process.”33 As 
a practical matter, state and federal prosecutors, and by extension de-
fense lawyers, play an important role in determining which noncitizens 
will be deported permanently or with the possibility of administrative 
relief.34 
In Padilla, a noncitizen who had been a lawful permanent resident 
of this country for over forty years pleaded guilty in state court to a fe-
lony drug charge that “made his deportation virtually mandatory.”35 His 
lawyer had assured him that having lived here so long, he did not have 
to worry about immigration consequences—which was obviously 
wrong because the drug transportation conviction would clearly make 
him deportable.36 Claiming his lawyer in the criminal proceeding was 
ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Padilla 
alleged that but for his attorney’s incorrect advice, he would have in-
sisted on going to trial.37 Analyzing the claim under the two-part test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel,38 the Court found that the defense 
counsel’s performance was deficient based on the incorrect advice on 
the risk of deportation, and it remanded on the issue of whether the at-
torney’s deficient performance prejudiced Padilla.39 
Padilla highlights the indeterminacy of the civil–criminal distinc-
tion and its significance for the procedural rights afforded to nonciti-
zens. In Padilla the civil–criminal distinction was considered in the 
narrow context of whether deportation was “collateral” to the criminal 
case or part of the criminal penalty that the defendant was required to 
understand before pleading guilty.40 While Padilla specifically brings 
immigration consequences into the ambit of defense counsel’s duties in 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1350 (2010). 
 35 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 36 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (West 2011); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (referring to a guilty 
plea for “transportation of a large amount of marijuana”). 
 37 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 38 Id. at 1482 (analyzing claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), 
which provides for relief if counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasona-
bleness,” and “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different”). 
 39 Id. at 1486. 
 40 Id. at 1480; see also United States v. Bethurum, 343 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[De-
fendant] testified that, as an employee of his family’s gun dealership, he would not have pleaded 
guilty to the offense had he known that the conviction would affect his ability to possess fire-
arms.”); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1963) (“[T]he conviction has 
been a source of embarrassment and loss of prestige to petitioner as a responsible citizen and 
union leader, and that if petitioner had fully realized the consequences of the plea, he would not 
have entered it.”); Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 18 n.6, 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223, at *18 n.6 (listing 
other severe “collateral consequences” of conviction, such as sex offender registration, civil 
commitment, professional disbarment) (citing Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004)) 
(“[D]efendant was unaware of committal for life as sexually dangerous person”). 
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a criminal case, the Court stopped short of labeling deportation as crim-
inal or civil, finding that the “collateral versus direct distinction” is “ill-
suited” to evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.41 In 
Padilla the Court was focused on the assistance of counsel in the crimi-
nal proceeding, not the related immigration proceeding when the immi-
gration consequences were actually imposed. The Court observed that 
deportation is a “particularly severe ‘penalty’”42 that is integral to the 
penalty aspects of a criminal case. At the same time, it stated that depor-
tation “is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,”43 and removal pro-
ceedings in immigration court are civil in nature.44 Still, the Court ac-
knowledged the interrelationship of these two proceedings: “Our law 
has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for 
nearly a century.”45 Because recent immigration law changes have made 
deportation “nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen 
offenders,” the Court added, it is “most difficult to divorce the penalty 
from the conviction in the deportation context.”46 
While immigration law has become more criminal in nature, Padil-
la and other examples remind us that this is not a one-way street.47 In 
criminal cases against a noncitizen, “civil” immigration law conse-
quences may drive the resolution of the case. “Bringing deportation 
consequences into this [criminal] process,”48 the Court explained, can 
be mutually beneficial to the defense and the prosecution, as the threat 
of immigration consequences is powerful incentive to plead guilty. Ef-
fective defense counsel would seek to negotiate a guilty plea that avoids 
or eliminates the risk of deportation.49 While in Padilla the risk of de-
portation could be readily ascertained from the relevant immigration 
statute, the Court acknowledged that many criminal lawyers are not 
versed in immigration law, which “can be complex, and is a legal spe-
cialty of its own.”50 
As a practical matter, one must ask which criminal procedural pro-
tections benefit a noncitizen defendant in a criminal case. In theory, 
noncitizens in criminal court are afforded the same rights as other crim-
inal defendants under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amend-
 
 41 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 42 Id. at 1481 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)). 
 43 Id. at 1482. 
 44 Id. at 1481 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1482. 
 47 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1298 (highlighting that while immigration scholars have chal-
lenged “the continuing classification of deportation as civil,” they have not explored “the opposite 
question of whether criminal law may serve an immigration screening function”). 
 48 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 1483. 
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ments.51 In practice, those rights may seem less robust to noncitizens in 
criminal cases for two main reasons. First, as Padilla reinforces, ninety-
five percent of all defendants are convicted by means of a guilty plea.52 
Defendants who plead guilty waive many constitutional rights, includ-
ing, typically, any challenge to guilt or pre-guilt issues,53 the right to 
jury trial and trial-based protections,54 proof of the elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt,55 and, often, the right to appeal.56 Padilla highlights 
that noncitizens face extreme pressure to plead guilty to avoid or mi-
nimize immigration consequences. Data on federal guilty pleas shows 
that noncitizen defendants plead guilty at higher rates than in other 
substantive areas.57 Aside from the right to appointed counsel, most 
noncitizen defendants may actually exercise few criminal rights in crim-
inal court. Second, noncitizens may not experience criminal procedure 
in the same way as citizens.58 
Noncitizens, especially those charged with immigration crimes, 
may be treated differently in criminal court.59 As Professor Eagly de-
scribes with respect to federal immigration prosecutions, many nonciti-
zens cannot obtain bail because they are already in immigration custody 
or would be if ordered released by the federal court.60 Prosecutors may 
have access to incriminating evidence obtained by immigration law 
enforcement under less protective standards, such as by interrogating a 
noncitizen without Miranda warnings,61 making warrantless border 
 
 51 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1295 (discussing the conventional view that noncitizen defendants 
in criminal courts are afforded a full panoply of criminal procedure rights and prosecutors enjoy 
institutional autonomy). 
 52 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.13; see also Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter 
(Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1393 (2011) (“[Padilla] may signal . . . the Court’s recognition 
of plea bargaining’s dominant role in criminal adjudication.”). 
 53 United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 54 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (“A plea of guilty . . . is itself a convic-
tion; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically contemplates that defendants may 
waive “the right to appeal,” and most do. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N); see also Nancy J. King & 
Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 
(2005) (finding that defendants waive appeal in nearly two-thirds of plea agreements nationwide). 
 57 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1323 fig.1, 1324 n.259 (discussing factors affecting guilty plea 
rates). 
 58 See id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: 
Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1423–32 (2011) (describ-
ing ways in which noncitizens are disadvantaged in criminal proceedings). 
 59 Chin, supra note 58, at 1423–32. 
 60 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1307 (describing an “immigration detainer,” which requires the 
district court to release a defendant to immigration custody); see also Chin, supra note 58, at 
1423–32 (describing denial of bail under state laws). 
 61 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1308 (describing how un-Mirandized statements obtained in “ad-
ministrative” or “noncustodial” settings later may be admitted against a criminal defendant). A 
witness’s undocumented status may be used to impeach him, thus impeding a defendant’s right to 
testify on his own behalf or the risk of summoning witnesses on his behalf. Chin, supra note 58, 
at 1427–28. Undocumented persons may be ineligible for nonprison sentences. Id. at 1430–31. 
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searches, or obtaining “administrative warrants” based on reasonable 
suspicion.62 Some jurisdictions expedite high-volume processing of 
immigration crimes under “Operation Streamline,” in which every illeg-
al re-entrant in a particular border sector is prosecuted, and the “Fast 
Track” program, in which noncitizens may plead guilty quickly in ex-
change for a discounted sentence.63 
The prosecution of noncitizens arrested in a 2008 immigration raid 
at a meat processing plant in Postville, Iowa offers an extreme example 
of how noncitizens may experience a form of criminal prosecution that 
is more administrative than criminal in nature.64 In that case, hundreds 
of noncitizen factory workers were arrested, appointed counsel in 
groups of ten or more, and within four days of arrest, they pleaded 
guilty and were sentenced on the same day.65 Most of them pleaded 
guilty to using false documents, which was unusual in that such undo-
cumented persons often are promptly deported, not charged criminal-
ly.66 The guilty plea agreements also contained a “stipulated removal 
order” in which they abandoned in criminal court any relief from re-
moval that they might have obtained in immigration court.67 Such en 
masse processing is reminiscent of removal proceedings against immi-
grant detainees rather than the individualized attention usually accorded 
criminal defendants in adjudicating guilt and imposing sentence.68 
Padilla underscores that as a practical matter criminal practice has 
been transformed by immigration law and vice versa. Federally, immi-
gration cases comprise over one-third of the total docket.69 Scholars 
have observed how immigration and criminal law enforcement activities 
at the state and federal levels have blurred the line between these two 
areas.70 The reality for noncitizen defendants is that immigration law 
 
 62 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1312–17 (referring to warrantless and administrative searches at 
the border or its “functional equivalent,” such as airport). 
 63 See Chacón, supra note 7, at 142 (describing Operations Streamline and Fast Track); 
Eagly, supra note 34, at 1321–24 (stating that in 2008 the median number of days for immigra-
tion case processing was less than 10 days, compared to 250 days for other crime categories). 
 64 Chacón, supra note 7, at 143; Eagly, supra note 34, at 1301–03. 
 65 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1301–03. 
 66 Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008 
at A1 (reporting that 260 of the immigrants were sentenced to five months for using false docu-
ments). 
 67 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1304. 
 68 Brandon Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 394–99 (2007) 
(highlighting the rhetorical emphasis on a criminal defendant’s individualized rights and day in 
court). 
 69 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: 
MARCH 31, 2010, at 12, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseload
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics2010.aspx (reporting that immigration filings made up 
35% of all criminal filings, an 11% increase over the prior year in terms of number of cases, and a 
10% increase over prior year in terms of number of defendants). 
 70 See Chacón, supra note 7, at 135 n.1 (citing Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: 
Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1827–
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may shape the terms of a guilty plea, the court’s processing of the case, 
and the sentence.71 This overlay of immigration law in the criminal 
process may render it a quasi-administrative process, especially for this 
class of defendants. 
 
C.     Criminal Aspects of Removal Proceedings 
 
Removal proceedings, which are traditionally civil and administra-
tive in nature, have many quasi-criminal features. This is in part a ref-
lection of the substantive criminal law focus in removal proceedings, as 
immigration courts adjudicate prior criminal convictions. But it also 
stems from the widespread use of detention of noncitizens, which af-
fects the circumstances of adjudication in important ways. Detention 
and lack of counsel greatly diminish a noncitizen’s chances of success 
in removal proceedings.72 Detention is a hardship on the individual and 
the family that may make it difficult to access legal services, get advice 
from family or community, or gather evidence to support a defense to 
removal charges or claim for discretionary relief. These circumstances 
may result in some noncitizens being unable to support a defense or 
foregoing defenses altogether in order to expedite deportation.73 
The rise in the number of persons in immigration detention has 
been dramatic.74 In 1994, approximately 6000 noncitizens were in de-
tention on any given day.75 By 2001, the daily detention rate had tripled 
to more than 20,000 individuals and by 2008 it had spiked to 33,000.76 
The annual detention rate over this same period jumped from approx-
 
32 (2007) (outlining “origins and consequences of the blurred boundaries between immigration 
control, crime control, and national security”)); Legomsky, supra note 7, at 471–72 (describing 
“growing convergence” of criminal justice and immigration control systems); Juliet Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376–77 
(2006). 
 71 See Chin, supra note 58, at 1430–31 (noting that undocumented persons may be ineligible 
for nonprison sentences under state law); Eagly, supra note 34, at 1318–19 (observing that nonci-
tizens are more likely to receive a prison sentence and serve more time at higher security prisons 
based on their classification as a “deportable alien”). 
 72 See Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, New York Immi-
grant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel 
in Removal Proceedings (pt. 1), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2011) [hereinafter NYIRS 
Report] (finding that in removal proceedings noncitizens with counsel were five times more 
likely than unrepresented noncitizens to obtain relief and that seventy-nine percent of detained 
noncitizens were unrepresented). 
 73 Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 46 
(2010). 
 74 Id. at 44–45.  
 75 Id.; DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRANT 
DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILI-
TIES? 6 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf. 
 76 Kalhan, supra note 73, at 44–45. 
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imately 81,000 to 380,000 individuals.77 Today, almost half of all re-
moval proceedings involve detainees, up from one-third of proceedings 
as recently as 2004.78 
This increase in detention stems from overall growth in immigra-
tion removal proceedings generally as well as statutory changes. Nonci-
tizens in detention comprise three main groups: persons deemed “inad-
missible” upon their arrival or return to the United States, persons in 
removal proceedings, and persons awaiting deportation after a final 
removal order.79 By statute, noncitizens facing removal based on a 
criminal conviction, including those alleged to have an aggravated felo-
ny conviction must be taken into immigration custody upon release 
from criminal custody.80 Aggravated felons are ineligible for bail pend-
ing removal.81 In 2010, approximately half of the 392,000 noncitizens 
removed from this country were convicted criminals, with drug crimes, 
immigration crimes, and criminal trafficking crimes leading the list of 
convictions.82 
The circumstances of immigration detention exacerbate the general 
hardship. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contracts 
with local jails and prisons for detention space, so although these nonci-
tizens are in “civil” detention, they often reside in a criminal jail setting 
and, even if separated, are treated like prisoners.83 Reported lack of 
medical care, inadequate conditions, separation of children from par-
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.; EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 STATIS-
TICAL YEAR BOOK, at O1 fig.23 (2009), available at http:// www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy08syb.pdf. 
 79 Kalhan, supra note 73, at 45. 
 80 Id. at 45 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006)); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of 
the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1936, 1938–43 (2000) (discussing expansion of grounds for deportability). 
 81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
 82 See FY2010 Sees Record Alien Removal from U.S., HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE, 
Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/fy2010-sees-record-alien-removal-us. 
In June 2011, ICE reported having removed 387,000 noncitizens, 169,000 of whom were con-
victed criminals. These reports do not specify whether the aliens were deemed aggravated felons, 
but the list of crimes suggest many were. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra 
note 4, at 3–4. The Department of Homeland Security reported in 2011 that it had initiated 
223,217 removal actions against criminal aliens in 2010 and had removed 169,000 convicted 
criminals. Id. The lag in actual removals compared to the number of charges suggests that a 
significant number of noncitizens succeed in getting the charge dismissed or obtaining discretio-
nary relief from removal (if the criminal conviction is not an aggravated felony). 
 83 Rachel L. Swarns, 2 Groups Compare Immigrant Detention Centers to Prisons, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A17 (describing children as young as six years old separated from their 
parents); A Growing Detention Network, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2008/12/26/us/1227_DETAIN.html (interactive map of local, private and federal 
detention centers used to house immigration detainees); see also About the U.S. Detention and 
Deportation System, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/
aboutdetention (noting that DHS owns and operates its own detention centers and contracts for 
bed space from over 312 county and city prisons nationwide). 
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ents,84 limited access to visitors,85 and deaths in custody all contribute 
to concerns about detention.86 Transfer of detainees far from their 
homes to remote detention facilities is routine and, some argue, raises 
due process concerns.87 Such transfers disrupt access to families, legal 
services, evidence, and witnesses, and tend to extend the length of de-
tention and delay immigration proceedings.88 
The removal proceeding itself is affected by these conditions. 
These proceedings often take place in a detention facility, with the same 
immigration judge and government attorneys in case after case.89 
Burgeoning caseloads and a steady backlog strain immigration judges, 
who complain that they simply do not have time to think. Because most 
noncitizens do not have counsel and may lack access to any legal ser-
vices, the burden falls on the immigration judge to develop the record, 
make sure the noncitizen understands their legal rights, and adjudicate a 
range of complex legal issues.90 These tasks are made more difficult by 
the lack of judges, staff, equipment, and translators. Some immigration 
judges spend all of their time in prisons, adjudicating removal proceed-
ings of convicted criminals in state custody before they are ever physi-
cally transferred to immigration detention.91 The agency appeals 
process is high-volume and handled by few judges. Federal circuit 
courts of appeals, which review petitions challenging removal orders, 
reverse immigration court decisions at higher rates than other kinds of 
appeals.92 
 
 84 Swarns, supra note 83. 
 85 Nina Bernstein, Volunteers Report on Treatment of Immigrant Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 29, 2010, at A26. 
 86 Scott M. Stringer & Andrew Friedman, Unfair to Immigrants, Costly for Taxpayers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at A23 (describing poor conditions, lack of medical care, and a reported 107 
deaths detained aliens from 2004 to 2010). 
 87 See Markowitz, supra note 8, at 348–50. 
 88 Kirk Semple, Transfers Delay Release of Detainees, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 
2011, at A20. 
 89  DHS operates detention facilities with full-time immigration courts on site. EOIR Immi-
gration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Oct. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm. 
 90 Julia Preston, Immigration Judges Found Under Strain, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A11 
(“[J]udges spoke of an overwhelming volume of cases with insufficient time for careful review, a 
shortage of law clerks and language interpreters, and failing computers and equipment for record-
ing hearings.”). 
 91 In New York, for example, Immigration Judge Roger Sagerman is assigned full time to 
adjudicate immigration removal actions in the Downstate and Ulster Correctional Facilities. See 
EOIR Immigration Court Listing, supra note 89. 
 92 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting a year-end forty percent 
reversal rate in appeals of Board of Immigration decisions, compared to an eighteen percent 
reversal rates in appeals in which the United States is appellee). Judge Posner stated that this high 
reversal rate was “due to the fact that the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level 
has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.” Id. at 830. A recent article cites an 
opinion authored by Judge Posner overturning an agency decision denying asylum. James War-
ren, Not Mincing Words Over Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at A21; see also Lynne Ma-
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D.     Aggravated Felony Determinations: Analyzing 
Criminal Law Immigration Courts 
 
The focus on criminal convictions requires immigration courts to 
assess immigration consequences of criminal convictions. To do that, 
immigration courts must analyze whether a state or federal conviction 
qualifies as a deportable offense.93 Though the starting and end point of 
this analysis is an immigration law issue, this often requires a technical 
analysis of criminal law and the record of the conviction.94 The defini-
tion of “aggravated felony” includes a long list of offenses, many of 
which refer to federal criminal statutes, and includes any federal- or 
state-law offense that meets the definition.95 Since only six percent of 
convictions occur in federal court,96 this analysis usually involves de-
termining whether a state court conviction under a state statute as inter-
preted under state law,97 qualifies under the federal definition of aggra-
vated felony.98 Unlike federal and state courts that actually handle 
criminal cases on a daily basis, the immigration court is not a criminal 
court, does not adjudicate guilt, and institutionally is not steeped in 
criminal procedure. Though administrative courts are empowered to 
 
rek, Posner Blasts Immigration Courts as ‘Inadequate’ and Ill-Trained, NAT’L L.J. ONLINE, Apr. 
22, 2008 (“This is a system of adjudication that is clearly inadequate.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 93 The inquiry may require detailed comparison of state criminal statutes to determine the 
contours of the federal definition and how to apply it, see Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 nn.5–
6 (2004) (surveying state statutes criminalizing injury caused by driver under the influence), or 
touch on complex issues of statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 
684 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing treatment of expunged state conviction for minor drug offense). 
 94 Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2587 n.12 (2010) (limiting inquiry to the 
state court record of conviction). 
 95 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011) (including in the definition any state, federal, or 
foreign conviction “for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 
years”). 
 96 MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SEN-
TENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004, at 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (“94% of felony convictions occurred in State courts, the remaining 6% in 
Federal courts.”). 
 97 Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1269 (2010) (stating that in determining whether 
a defendant’s Florida conviction was “violent felony” under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the 
Court is “bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law,” including the ele-
ments of the statute under which the defendant was convicted). 
 98 See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at  2587 n.12 (“Linking our inquiry to the record of 
conviction comports with how we have categorized convictions for state offenses within the 
definition of generic federal criminal sanctions under the Armed Career Criminal Act . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). Analysis of aggravated felony convictions and prior convictions under the 
ACCA requires careful analysis of each state’s law as interpreted by that state’s highest court. 
See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009) (observing that categorical analysis 
of prior convictions under the ACCA “is not always easy to apply”); Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (surveying state law statutes to derive generic definition of “burglary” under 
the ACCA). 
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perform such analysis for ancillary matters not within their subject ex-
pertise, aggravated felony determinations present a hybrid situation in 
which an immigration law expressly refers to definitions not within the 
agency’s expertise.99 
For example, the aggravated felony definition for “crime of vi-
olence” requires courts to analyze prior convictions under state and fed-
eral criminal law to determine whether prior conviction qualifies as an 
aggravated felony. The term “aggravated felony” includes “a crime of 
violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a purely 
political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least one 
year.”100 The definition of aggravated felony would include any state or 
federal offense that meets this description101 with two exceptions: it 
only includes felonies and does not include “purely political” of-
fenses.102 So the first step is to determine whether the conviction is a 
“crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a nonimmigration statute that 
is part of the criminal code, and the second step would be to determine 
whether any immigration statute exceptions apply. 
To determine if a prior conviction is an “aggravated felony,” im-
migration courts usually follow the same analysis as criminal courts 
when analyzing prior convictions.103 Federal criminal courts have ana-
lyzed prior convictions in a variety of settings, primarily to determine 
whether statutory recidivist or other sentencing enhancements apply. 
One such statute is the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which 
enhances the sentence imposed upon certain firearm-law offenders who 
also have three prior “violent felony” convictions.104 In analyzing 
whether a prior state conviction meets the definition of “violent felony,” 
courts apply a “categorical method” by examining the elements of the 
 
 99 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (“The weight we accord the agency’s 
explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, 
and persuasiveness.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) 
(recognizing agency jurisdiction to adjudicate claim under statutory procedure because that claim 
and related counterclaim were “necessary” to agency’s exercise of jurisdiction). 
 100 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
 101 The law defines “crime of violence” as: 
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
cal force against the person or property of another, or 
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course 
of committing the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). 
 102 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (excluding “a purely political offense” from the definition). 
 103 See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 
 104 The ACCA defines “violent felony” to include: first, felonies with elements that involve 
the use of physical force against another; second, felonies that amount to “burglary, arson, or 
extortion” or that involve the use of explosives; and third, felonies that “otherwise involv[e] 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (West 2011). 
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federal or state statute of conviction and the nature of the offense,105 
without regard to the particular facts of the crime.106 A prior conviction 
qualifies if the statute of conviction meets the “violent felony” defini-
tion and is no broader.107 If the statute of conviction is broader than the 
“violent felony” definition, the court advances to a second step in which 
it may consider a narrow range of documents from the record of convic-
tion to assess whether the defendant’s conviction necessarily establishes 
that he was convicted of conduct that meets the “violent felony” defini-
tion.108 
In analyzing prior convictions, criminal courts do not engage in 
formal fact finding. Some debate this point because the factual analysis 
of the record conviction can be technical and factually detailed, and its 
consequences in the later proceeding can be enormous.109 But the dis-
tinction is legally significant because criminal defendants have a Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial on any fact other than a prior conviction 
that is sufficient to raise the statutory maximum penalty.110 The Su-
preme Court has thus been careful to limit the prior conviction analysis 
to avoid new fact-finding and has restricted the inquiry to historical 
facts contained in judicial documents from the record of conviction.111 
 
 105 See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127–30 (2009) (analyzing state failure-
to-report conviction to determine whether it is a “violent felony” under § 924(e)); James v. United 
States, 550 U.S. 192, 203–07 (2007) (analyzing state attempted burglary conviction to determine 
whether it is a “burglary” under § 924(e)); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19–25 (2005) 
(analyzing state burglary conviction by guilty plea to determine if it is a “burglary” under 
§ 924(e)); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990) (analyzing state burglary con-
viction by jury verdict to determine if it qualifies as a “burglary” for sentencing enhancement 
under the ACCA). 
 106 See Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (discussing categorical analysis applied in 
analyzing prior convictions under the ACCA). 
 107 The ACCA definition of “violent felony” is similar to the definition of “crime of violence” 
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and incorporated in the aggravated felony definition in 8 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F). 
 108 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
 109 Justice Thomas has criticized as unconstitutional the prior-conviction exception to the 
Court’s general rule, articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the Sixth 
Amendment prohibits judicial determination of facts that increase the statutory maximum sen-
tence. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26–27 (Thomas, J., concurring). The prior-conviction exception 
allows for judicial determination of a prior conviction, even though the inquiry often requires 
factual analysis, if not findings of fact. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 
239–44 (1998). The Court in Shepard acknowledged the risk that prior-conviction analysis, if too 
factually involved, could run afoul of the Sixth Amendment: 
While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too 
far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much 
like the findings [requiring right to jury findings under] Jones and Apprendi, to say that 
Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute. 
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25. 
 110 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 111 For jury-verdict convictions, courts analyze the jury verdict, jury instructions, and charging 
documents. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02. For guilty-plea convictions, the court analyzes the plea 
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The Court has prohibited consideration of other documents, like a police 
report, which it said “is too far removed from the conclusive signific-
ance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings” that 
would trigger a jury-trial right.112 As a practical matter, courts seek to 
avoid relitigation of valid convictions and do not entertain challenges to 
the validity of a prior conviction in a later case.113 While the prior-
conviction analysis may be extremely technical, it has consistently been 
treated as a legal inquiry that does not require factfinding.  
Immigration courts generally perform the same two-step legal 
analysis in analyzing criminal convictions for immigration purposes. 
The immigration court does not engage in factfinding so long as it is 
analyzing a general offense, like “theft” or “crime of violence.”114 The 
court’s analysis focuses on documents and transcripts from the record of 
conviction, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.115 
At this stage, however, the noncitizen facing deportation for an aggra-
vated felony conviction no longer has a right to appointed counsel, is 
detained, and his access to documents from his record of conviction 
may be limited to those presented by the government attorney. As a 
practical matter, it may be very difficult for an unrepresented noncitizen 
to challenge the prior conviction because the analysis is so technical and 
may turn on subtleties of law and documentary inferences that are not 
obvious to the uninitiated.116 
 
agreement and plea colloquy to determine the factual basis for the plea. Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 
2299 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Defendants cannot challenge the validity of a prior conviction in federal sentencing unless 
the defendant was self-represented. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 506 (1994). 
 114 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2586 n.11 (noting that this approach 
applies to “generic” offenses but not “circumstance-specific” offenses, like “fraud or deceit in 
which the loss to the . . . victims exceeds $10,000,” like in Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2301). In 
Nijhawan, the immigration court was permitted to determine whether the fraud exceeded 
$10,000, even though that loss amount was not an element of the statute of conviction. Nijhawan, 
129 S. Ct. at 2303. 
 115 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (2006) (providing that the government must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the alien is removable, for example, based on the prior aggravated 
felony, and can rely on a range of documents from the record of conviction, including court 
transcripts, records, and judgments of conviction). 
 116 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (“Immigration law can be complex, 
and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing crimi-
nal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it.”); Singh v. Gon-
zales, 499 F.3d 969, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The maze of immigration statutes and amendments is 
notoriously complicated and has been described as ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in 
complexity.”’ (quoting Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir.1988))). 
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E.     Improving Fairness in Immigration Court 
 
Deportation is a severe consequence for any crime, especially for 
persons who are here legally and rooted to the United States by culture, 
language, family, and work. Treating immigrants like criminals, but 
without the procedural protections afforded criminals or comparable 
opportunities for judicial review, presents a serious judicial and consti-
tutional concern.117 While many scholars have observed that the crimi-
nalization of immigration law has been asymmetric,118 the question of 
how to respond to this inequality presents its own problems. Some urge 
that immigration law should remain faithful to its civil origins, i.e., by 
resisting the trend towards criminalization.119 This may be unrealistic at 
least with respect to removal of aggravated felons, which accounts for a 
large portion of removals and involves no discretionary opportunity for 
relief by the immigration officials once the charge has been filed. Oth-
ers argue that immigrants in quasi-criminal removal proceedings should 
be afforded criminal or quasi-criminal procedural protections.120 This 
concept presents practical and theoretical questions about the overlap 
and uniqueness of criminal and immigration proceedings. Which crimi-
nal rights should be applied? What is the source of those rights? How 
would they apply in an immigration court setting? On this point, scho-
lars have argued that Sixth Amendment criminal rights could apply if 
immigration proceedings were simply reclassified as criminal,121 and, 
short of that, the Court in Padilla has opened the door to enhanced 
rights under the Fifth Amendment that could serve similar purposes.122 
Still others have observed the gaps and inefficiencies of these overlap-
ping adjudication systems.123 In these analyses, criminal procedural 
protections are usually deemed the gold standard and superior to Fifth 
Amendment due process protections, which tend to be more flexible and 
forgiving.124 
 
 117 Legomsky, supra note 7. 
 118 Chacón, supra note 7, at 135 n.1; Legomsky, supra note 7; Markowitz, supra note 3, at 
1339–47. 
 119 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1339–47 
 120 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1467–72; Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1334. 
 121 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1472–73.  
 122 Id. (arguing that Padilla supports the “Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment” which “embodies 
both the flexible due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment and—for at least certain types of 
deportation—the more specific protections of the Sixth Amendment”); Markowitz, supra note 3, 
at 1360–61. 
 123 See generally Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigra-
tion Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131 (2002). 
 124 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1472–73. 
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Against this background, the option remains that the Fifth 
Amendment provides a superior vehicle to securing procedural protec-
tions for noncitizens facing removal on the basis of prior criminal con-
viction. This approach is grounded in the Fifth Amendment due process 
concepts—which clearly apply in immigration proceedings—and ani-
mated by concerns about the unique issues that arise when immigration 
courts detain, process, and deport noncitizens based on their prior con-
victions. Charting a new path specifically tailored to immigration law 
allows courts to create protections that are protective of immigrants and 
specifically tailored to the immigration issues they face, while ensuring 
judicial review of immigration decisions. This approach is feasible un-
der core principles recognized by the Supreme Court in its immigration 
jurisprudence. 
 
II.     A JUDICIAL REVIEW FRAMEWORK FOR CREATING PROCEDURAL 
PROTECTIONS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 
 
The Supreme Court has asserted a dynamic role for the judiciary in 
immigration matters, especially those involving prior criminal convic-
tions. The Court has carefully acted to safeguard judicial review even in 
the face of congressional efforts to strip the court of such power. The 
Court has affirmed that courts are the arbiters of constitutional issues 
(including due process) and statutory interpretation. Recognizing the 
interests at stake in detention and removal proceedings, the Court has 
created general procedural rules to ensure due process protection, while 
being sensitive to the policy decisions at stake in immigration proceed-
ings. On matters of statutory interpretation, the Court defers to the im-
migration agency on matters of immigration law, while crediting judi-
cial expertise in such areas as constitutional law, statutory construction, 
and, significantly, criminal law. 
These core concepts reinforce that reviewing courts serve an im-
portant function in innovating procedural safeguards for noncitizens in 
removal proceedings. Such protections need not rely on criminal proce-
dure or a classification of immigration proceedings as civil or criminal. 
Rather, they can instead be interposed judicially by interpreting immi-
gration statutes to benefit the noncitizen, promote transparency and 
judicial review, and avoid constitutional concerns, or, if needed, to en-
sure fairness as a matter of constitutional due process. The judicial prac-
tice of using statutory interpretation, especially the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance, to protect noncitizens in immigration proceedings is 
not new, though the criminal law emphasis in contemporary immigra-
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tion law provides a new facet to this practice.125 Immigration procedural 
protections could prove more effective than their criminal procedure 
counterparts if specifically tailored to the issues noncitizens face in this 
administrative process and with sensitivity to the government’s policy 
concerns on immigration matters.126 And while due process violations 
are traditionally reviewed on a case-by-case basis, the Court has been 
willing to craft due process–based rules to apply to a class of nonciti-
zens in removal proceedings, thus creating a framework that avoids 
foreseeable or repeat violations. 
 
A.     Preserving Judicial Review: Constitutional and 
Statutory Expertise 
 
While the Supreme Court has traditionally been reluctant to inter-
fere in immigration decisions, it has long reviewed them on due process 
grounds, and has resisted Congress’s efforts to eliminate judicial review 
entirely. The Court has instead inserted itself into immigration matters 
in ways that are procedural in nature, take into account systemic immi-
gration problems, and may affect outcomes in immigration court. Judi-
cial review of immigration decisions is on a pathway to become more, 
not less, rigorous. In this evolution, traditional reasons for shielding 
immigration decisions from rigorous judicial review might be seen as a 
basis for developing immigration-specific interventions tailored to 
agency goals and the problems facing noncitizens in immigration 
courts. 
 
1.     Traditional Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions 
 
Several background principles inform judicial review of immigra-
tion decisions and the basic question of whether courts should defer to 
the Executive on immigration matters. The Court early on established 
 
 125 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548–49 (1990) (arguing 
that aliens tend to receive more favorable treatment when courts rely on statutory interpretation, 
especially the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, based on “phantom constitutional norms”). 
 126 Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptio-
nalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (describing a central feature of “immigration 
exceptionalism” as “the plenary power doctrine, which severely limits judicial review when a 
government decision regarding a noncitizen’s entry or continued presence in the United States is 
challenged on constitutional grounds”). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Excep-
tionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307 (2000) 
(commenting on Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and 
Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 257 (2000)). 
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that the political branches, namely, Congress and the Executive, have 
plenary power over immigration.127 Constitutionally, this broad power 
is usually justified under Congress’s power to conduct foreign affairs, 
though that provision does not mention immigration.128 In Chinese Ex-
clusion Case, the Court concluded that in light of the federal govern-
ment’s power to regulate immigration, immigration decisions were non-
justiciable political questions and “conclusive upon the judiciary.”129 
Soon, however, concerns about this unchecked power over immi-
gration led to minimal due process review. Several Justices, dissenting 
in an 1893 immigration case, questioned whether a statute that allowed 
immigration officials to seize and deport Chinese residents without 
judicial review violated due process.130 A few years later in Japanese 
Immigrant Case, the Court permitted review of a noncitizen’s due 
process claim, but did not find a due process violation.131 In that case, 
the noncitizen, four days after her arrival, was ordered by immigration 
officials to be arrested and removed on the suspicion that she was a 
pauper and would become a public charge.132 The Court recognized that 
an alien residing here, even if here illegally, was entitled as a matter of 
due process to be heard on her right to be and remain in the United 
States.133 The Court concluded that the petitioner had not been denied 
the opportunity to be heard, and that the immigration inspector’s deci-
sion, having never been appealed to the Secretary, was “final and con-
clusive.”134 Japanese Immigrant Case established the Court would re-
view constitutional challenges to agency removal decisions based on 
due process grounds.135 
 
 127 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surro-
gates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1634 (1992) (citing Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)). 
 128 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 181 (5th ed. 2003) (“The federal government’s power to conduct foreign affairs . . . has 
led the courts to invalidate state statutes that attempt to regulate immigration.”). 
 129 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1634 (citing Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609); 
see also Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigra-
tion, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2008) (discussing the plenary power doctrine in Chinese Ex-
clusion Case). 
 130 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1635 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698 (1893)). 
 131 Id. at 1637 (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)). 
 132 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 87. 
 133 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1637 (citing Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101). 
 134 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 102. 
 135 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1638. Over the years, the Court has distinguished be-
tween those aliens who are here facing deportation and those who are excludable at the border. Id. 
at 1643 (discussing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) 
(upholding the exclusion without a hearing on national security grounds a returning permanent 
resident who briefly returned to Eastern Europe to visit his dying mother behind “the Iron Cur-
tain”) and Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982) (recognizing that a legal permanent 
resident, returning from a brief trip abroad, is entitle to due process when threatened with deporta-
tion)). 
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For decades courts reviewed immigration removal decisions solely 
in habeas review.136 The Immigration Act of 1917 provided that a de-
portation order by the Attorney General “shall be final,” and the Court 
had interpreted that provision to preclude “judicial intervention in de-
portation cases except insofar as it was required by the Constitution.”137 
Immigration orders were not reviewable under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) until 1952,138 and in 1961 Congress replaced district 
court APA review with initial-deportation-order review in courts of 
appeals.139 At the same time, Congress specifically preserved federal 
habeas review on statutory and constitutional challenges to deportation 
orders.140 
While courts had a limited role in reviewing final deportation or-
ders, they played an important role in deciding whether convicted non-
citizens would be subject to removal at all.141 Under the 1917 Act, 
which authorized deportation based on certain convictions, sentencing 
courts had an important procedure, known as a judicial recommendation 
against deportation (JRAD). The JRAD authorized the sentencing judge 
in both state and federal prosecutions to recommend “that such 
alien . . . not be deported,” either at the time of sentencing or within 
thirty days thereafter.142 The Court’s decision was understood to be 
“part of the sentencing” process143 and was binding on the agency.144 
The JRAD was codified and continued to exist until 1990.145 During 
 
 136 Zadvydas v. Ashcroft, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 137 Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 230, 232 n.4, 234 (1953). 
 138 Id. at 235 (holding that APA did not apply to immigration cases, reaffirming that a nonciti-
zen “may attack a deportation only by habeas corpus,” and reaffirming that deportation orders 
“remain immune to direct attack”). But see id. at 236 (acknowledging precedent for litigant to 
challenge a deportation order on the basis of their status). 
 139 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687–88 (citing Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 5, 75 Stat. 651 (repealed 
1996)). 
 140 Id. at 687–88 (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51–52 (1955)); see also Act of 
Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, sec. 106(a), § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651 (1961) (repealed 1996). 
 141 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479–80 (discussing JRAD procedure). 
 142 The full text of the JRAD provision read as follows: 
That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor 
shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing 
such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence 
or within thirty days thereafter . . . make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor 
that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act. 
Id. at 1479 n.3 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006))). 
 143 Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 144 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479 (explaining that the statute was “consistently . . . interpreted as 
giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should 
be disregarded as a basis for deportation” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Janvier, 
793 F.2d at 452)). 
 145 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (“Congress first circumscribed 
the JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and in 1990 Congress 
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that period, the class of deportable offenses had grown, but noncitizens 
could still apply to the sentencing judge for the JRAD or the agency for 
discretionary relief from removal. Importantly, the JRAD ensured that 
judges retained discretion to prevent deportation of convicted nonciti-
zens on a case-by-case basis. 
In 1996, Congress enacted the major immigration changes that 
dramatically increased the stakes on prior criminal convictions. By this 
time, judicial relief from deportation using the JRAD had been elimi-
nated, leaving deportation or “removal”146 decisions solely to immigra-
tion officials. The 1996 laws greatly expanded the list of “aggravated 
felonies,” made them automatically deportable offenses, and eliminated 
the Attorney General’s discretion to grant relief from removal, such as 
voluntary departure, cancellation of removal, or withholding of removal 
based on asylum-related concerns.147 Congress also enacted several 
provisions to eliminate all judicial review of immigration removal deci-
sions.148 This sweeping immigration reform signaled a new era in im-
migration enforcement and policy. The judicial backlash that ensued 
laid the groundwork for more robust scrutiny of immigration decisions 
by courts. 
 
2.     Judicial Protection of Judicial Review of 
Immigration Decisions 
 
The Supreme Court’s cognizance of its important constitutional 
role in reviewing immigration matters is evident in its treatment of re-
moval orders. In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court held that habeas review re-
mained available to persons challenging the constitutionality of removal 
orders, despite new statutory provisions that could have been interpreted 
to eliminate any judicial review of immigration decisions. The case 
involved a challenge to the application of comprehensive immigration 
 
entirely eliminated it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's 
authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation . . . .”). 
 146 Beginning in 1996, Congress has used the term “removal” to refer to deportation. Padilla, 
130 S. Ct. at 1480 n.6 (citing Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.1 (2001)). 
 147 Id. at 1480 (“Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation . . . 
had been exercised to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year period 
prior to 1996 . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 148 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001). The IIRIRA eliminated direct judicial review of 
a petition by an alien deemed removable for a criminal conviction, though courts still retained 
power to determine their own jurisdiction and consider in that inquiry whether the alien was 
removable. See, e.g., Zavaleta-Gallegos v. INS, 261 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). In 2005, 
Congress expanded direct judicial review of legal and constitutional claims in petitions by people 
ordered removed on the basis of a prior criminal conviction, and limited habeas review of final 
deportation orders. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 106, 119 Stat. 
231, 310 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006)). The REAL ID Act applied retroactively 
to all final removal orders issues before, on or after May 11. 2005. Id. at 311. 
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law changes enacted in 1996 under the AEDPA and the IIRIRA.149 In 
St. Cyr, the noncitizen (St. Cyr) had been convicted of a drug offense 
that made him deportable before the 1996 laws took effect. St. Cyr 
would have been eligible for discretionary relief from deportation at the 
time of his conviction,150 but by the time of his removal proceedings a 
year later, such discretionary relief had been eliminated under the new 
laws. St. Cyr brought a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 arguing 
that the new laws should not apply to him because his guilty plea be-
came final before they were enacted.151 
As a threshold matter, the Court was faced with deciding if it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case in light of four new provisions that ap-
peared to eliminate the judicial review of final deportation orders.152 As 
a starting point, the Court recognized that the issue presented was 
“purely a question of law,” presenting no factual issues or challenge to 
the exercise of discretionary agency authority.153 This legal question, 
more importantly, raised a serious constitutional concern. The govern-
ment argued that the new provisions eliminated judicial review so there 
existed “no judicial forum available to decide” the legal issue.154 Con-
struing these statutes to eliminate habeas jurisdiction would give rise to 
“substantial constitutional questions” under the Suspension Clause, 
which limits Congress’s power to suspend the writ.155 
The Court ultimately avoided this “difficult and significant” consti-
tutional question by holding that the new laws did not eliminate habeas 
review of immigration decisions.156 Toward that result, the Court ap-
plied three core concepts of statutory interpretation: it required a clear 
legislative statement to repeal habeas review, it applied the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to preserve judicial review, and it construed the 
 
 149 St Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292. 
 150 Id. at 293. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 593 (discussing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 309–10). One provision 
of AEDPA, § 401(e)—though entitled “ELIMINATION OF CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS 
CORPUS”—merely repealed a judicial-review provision without mentioning the habeas statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 2241. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 309. Three other provisions were contained in IIRIRA: one 
specified the law applicable to judicial review of a final order of removal in the reviewing court, 
see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(1); a second required consolidation of judicial review of all questions of 
law and fact, including the application of statutory and constitutional provisions, in an appeal of a 
final order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); and a third states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to 
review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having commit-
ted” certain enumerated criminal offenses, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 
311–14. 
 153 Id. at 298. 
 154 Id. at 294–99. 
 155 The Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, provides: “The Privilege of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.” 
 156 Traum, supra note 152, at 593–94. 
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new provisions against a long history permitting judicial review of the 
legality of immigration decisions. 
First, the Court rejected any repeal of habeas jurisdiction by impli-
cation and insisted on a “clear statement” that Congress intended to 
repeal habeas review.157 This rule was supported, the Court said, be-
cause there is a “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of ad-
ministrative action,” and the Suspension Clause is a limitation on Con-
gress’s authority.158 
Second, the Court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
to preserve judicial review and to avoid having to decide a “serious 
Suspension Clause issue.”159 The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is 
a canon of statutory construction that requires courts to construe a sta-
tute to avoid serious constitutional problems if an alternative interpreta-
tion is fairly possible.160 Here, the elimination of judicial or habeas re-
view presented a serious constitutional issue because some “judicial 
intervention in deportation cases” is unquestionably “required by the 
Constitution.”161 Rather than decide a thorny Suspension Clause issue, 
the Court opted to preserve judicial review. 
Finally, the Court looked to historical practice. Habeas corpus had 
“always been available” to review the legality of executive detention. 
Before 1952 habeas review was the sole means of judicial review of 
final deportation orders. And at least since 1961 habeas review of im-
migration decisions was not limited to constitutional issues, but in-
cluded other questions of law, even those arising in the context of dis-
cretionary relief.162 “At its historical core,” the Court stated, “the writ of 
habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Execu-
tive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been 
strongest.”163 
 
 157 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299. 
 158 Id. (“[W]hen a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ 
[sic] power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”); see also Traum, 
supra note 152, at 590 (“The Suspension Clause is a limitation on Congress's power to legislate 
and appears in Article I, Section 9, with other limitations on congressional authority.”) (citing 
Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 566 (2002)). 
 159 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–301. 
 160 Id. at 299–300; see also Motomura, supra note 125, at 561, 564 (observing that courts 
commonly apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as a statutory interpretation canon, in 
the immigration context this doctrine conflicts with the constitutional notion that executive power 
over immigration is plenary and nonreviewable). 
 161 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)). 
 162 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679–80 (2001); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306–07. 
 163 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n.14 (“At common law, ‘[w]hile habeas review of a court judg-
ment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court’s jurisdictional competency, an attack on an 
executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of the detention.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Note, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1038, 1238 (1970))). 
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St. Cyr laid important groundwork for robust review of immigra-
tion decisions and executive detention generally.164 The Court described 
its traditional habeas review function broadly, observing that courts in 
habeas were not relegated to simply determining whether immigration 
statutes or individualized immigration decisions violate the Constitu-
tion, but also redressed erroneous application or interpretation of immi-
gration statutes.165 The Court’s authority to construe immigration sta-
tutes is aided by canons of statutory construction that, as a practical 
matter, may make it more likely to side with the noncitizen.166 This is 
because when the application of statutory canons of construction resolve 
statutory ambiguities, there is no occasion to defer to the agency’s own 
interpretation.167 Thus, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and “the 
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in depor-
tation statutes in favor of the alien” may cause the Court to favor nonci-
tizens when interpreting immigration statutes.168 
Importantly, in safeguarding its habeas review of immigration de-
cisions, the Court in St. Cyr was marking its own territory, defining its 
constitutional role in the face of Congress’s broad immigration authori-
ty. The Court was more concerned with policing the limits of Con-
gress’s power under the Suspension Clause (an issue it ultimately 
avoided) than with respecting the breadth of Congress’s plenary power 
over immigration matters (an issue it never even mentioned).169 Subse-
quently, the Court has defended its traditional judicial powers in the 
 
 164 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (citing St. Cyr for historical back-
ground on habeas review of executive detention); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004). 
 165 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302–03. 
 166 See Motomura, supra note 125, at 548 (observing that aliens receive favorable treatment 
when courts interpret immigration statutes using “subconstitutional norms”). 
 167 St Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 n.45 (rejecting the need for Chevron deference, see Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because the Court “only 
defer[s] . . . to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal ‘tools of statutory 
construction,’ are ambiguous”); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (“It is not at 
all unusual to give a statute's ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the 
statute's applications, even though other of the statute's applications, standing alone, would not 
support the same limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.”) (citing, 
inter alia, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. at 11–12 n.8, which explains that, “if a statute has criminal 
applications, ‘the rule of lenity applies’ to the Court's interpretation of the statute even in immi-
gration cases ‘[b]ecause we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its 
application in a criminal or noncriminal context’” (alteration in original)). 
 168 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)). 
 169 Neuman, supra note 158, at 561–62 (noting that “[t]he ‘plenary power’ of Congress over 
immigration played no explicit role in the opinions,” in that “neither the majority nor the dissent 
argued that the force of the Suspension Clause was diminished in the field of immigration law”); 
see also Legomsky, supra note 126, at 312 (“[I]f the issue on the merits presents an important 
enough general principle, the Court will find a way around the principle of plenary congressional 
power.”). 
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immigration context to ensure that noncitizens receive adequate process 
and access to judicial review.170 
The Court’s review of criminal issues in the immigration context 
reinforces that it is constantly policing the boundaries of Congress’s and 
the Executive’s immigration authority. St. Cyr suggests concerns about 
separation of powers and statutory interpretation. In criminal cases, as 
discussed below, these boundaries recognize a separation between crim-
inal (involving federal law and state sovereignty) and immigration au-
thority and competence. The Court appears to be confining immigration 
authority to matters within its traditional expertise and resolving statuto-
ry interpretation issues without deference to agency interpretation in 
many instances. 
 
B.     Zavydas: Creating General Rules to Ensure Due Process 
and Minimize Judicial Interference 
 
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance has been used to powerful 
effect. In Zadvydas v. Davis,171 which was decided in the same term as 
St. Cyr, the Supreme Court created a statute-based rule limiting post-
removal detention to six months in order to prevent due process con-
cerns about persons who may face indefinite detention.172 Zadvydas 
provides a blueprint for innovating procedural protections on a class-
wide basis to avoid recurring, foreseeable due process problems in the 
immigration context. The Court’s reason for such a clear and protective 
rule was premised, at least in part, on its desire to avoid judicial inter-
vention in sensitive immigration matters. This kind of immigration-
specific, prophylactic due process rule could be replicated for other 
aspects of immigration. 
The Court in Zadvydas confronted the problem of indefinite detai-
nees who, despite having been ordered removed, were still in custody 
because they could not be repatriated to another country.173 The consol-
idated cases involved two detainees, both of whom were ordered re-
moved based on prior criminal convictions. Zadvydas was born in 1948 
to Lithuanian parents in a displaced-persons camp in Germany and im-
 
 170 See Kucan v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (holding that IIRIRA did not eliminate 
judicial review of motion to reopen removal proceedings, a longstanding “‘important safeguard’ 
that assures that the alien’s claims have been accorded a reasonable hearing”); Nken v. Holder, 
129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009) (affirming judicial power to stay removal proceedings in order to facilitate 
judicial review and rejecting the government’s argument that such stays violated prohibition on 
injunctive relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)). 
 171 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 172 Id. at 701. 
 173 Id. at 684–87. 
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migrated to the United States at age eight.174 Kim Ho Ma, who was born 
in Cambodia, fled with his family to Thailand and the Philippines be-
fore coming to the United States at age seven. A post-removal statute 
required mandatory detention after entry of a final removal order and 
during the ninety-day removal period.175 Detention was permitted 
beyond the ninety-day removal period and could continue indefinitely, 
provided the matter of detention was reviewed within a year or earlier if 
conditions changed.176 Zadvydas and Ma each were detained well 
beyond the ninety-day period and filed habeas actions challenging the 
government’s authority to detain them indefinitely under the statute.177 
The Court in Zadvydas relied on constitutional avoidance to create 
a reasonable time limit on post-removal detention. Because detention 
“lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause, a 
statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious 
constitutional problem.178 The fact that this detention was civil rather 
than criminal heightened the Court’s concern. Criminal detention is 
imposed “with adequate procedural protections,” but here there was “no 
sufficiently strong special justification” for indefinite civil detention and 
insufficient procedural protections afforded to the detainees.179 The 
Court rejected the government’s arguments that “alien status itself can 
justify indefinite detention,” reiterating that noncitizens who have en-
tered the country are entitled to due process protection.180 Congress’s 
plenary power, the Court said, “is subject to important constitutional 
limitations.”181 Finding no clear intent to authorize indefinite detention, 
the Court interpreted the statute to contain a reasonable duration limit of 
six months on post-removal detention.182 
The six-month rule adopted by the Court was intended to facilitate 
Executive action on immigration matters that satisfy due process with-
out judicial interference. Under traditional habeas review powers, courts 
have authority to review case-by-case the lawfulness of executive deten-
tion without trial.183 Here, the Court acknowledged that judicial interfe-
rence in immigration matters was undesirable, given “the greater immi-
gration-related expertise” of the Executive Branch, its “primary 
responsibility” over immigration matters, the serious concerns inherent 
in enforcing complex immigration laws, and “the Nation’s need to 
 
 174 Id. at 684–85. 
 175 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(2) (West 2011). 
 176 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683. 
 177 Id. at 688. 
 178 Id. at 690. 
 179 Id. at 690–92. 
 180 Id. at 692–94. 
 181 Id. at 694. 
 182 Id. at 701. 
 183 Id. at 699. 
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speak with one voice on immigration matters.”184 Ordinary principles of 
judicial review, the Court explained, “counsel judges to give expert 
agencies decision making leeway in matters that invoke their expertise,” 
including sensitive foreign judgments affecting repatriation.185 The six-
month rule, the Court explained, would “recognize some presumptively 
reasonable period of detention” and “limit the occasions when courts 
will need” to interfere in detention matters in individualized cases.186 
The Court specifically referenced presumptions in criminal law that 
operate similarly, by creating a constitutional safe harbor that minimizes 
case-by-case judicial oversight.187 
Zadvydas provides a framework for innovating procedural protec-
tions in the immigration context to avoid due process violations and 
minimize judicial interference. There, the Court recognized that the six-
month rule would affect a class of individuals subject to a post-removal 
statute. Using the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court inter-
posed a reasonable time limit on the post-removal statute to avoid re-
peat, foreseeable due process violations. The post-removal, possibly 
indefinite detention was civil in nature and had no criminal analog. The 
Court’s approach of creating a prophylactic rule establishing a presump-
tively constitutional duration of post-removal detention was drawn from 
criminal procedure law. But the rationale for this rule—to permit the 
Executive Branch leeway in immigration matters and limit judicial 
oversight—was tailored to the immigration context and unique impor-
tance of reviewing executive, not criminal, detention. 
 
C.     Immigration Court’s Inexpertise in Criminal Law 
 
The focus of immigration law on criminal law issues requires im-
migration courts to determine legal issues outside their traditional area 
of expertise. While immigration law has for nearly a century attached 
immigration consequences to criminal convictions, for much of that 
period this practice was limited to certain drug offenses, very serious 
crimes, and “crimes involving moral turpitude,” a broad immigration 
 
 184 Id. at 700. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 701. 
 187 Id. (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379–80 (1966) (plurality opinion), which 
“adopt[s] [a] rule, based on definition of “petty offense” in United States Code, that right to jury 
trial extends to all cases in which sentence of six months or greater is imposed,” and County of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–58 (1991), which “adopt[s] [a] presumption, based on 
[the] lower court[’s] estimate of time needed to process arrestee, that [a] 48-hour delay in proba-
ble-cause hearing after arrest is reasonable, hence constitutionally permissible”). 
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law descriptor.188 The operation of criminal law within immigration has 
greatly evolved, especially under the expanded “aggravated felony” 
definition enacted in 1996. Today immigration courts analyze a wide 
range of state and federal convictions, applying state and federal crimi-
nal laws and evaluating criminal records of conviction to determine 
what qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” This definitional analysis is a 
large and complex undertaking. The definition of “aggravated felony” 
describes over twenty separate offense categories; it applies to any qua-
lifying state, federal, or foreign conviction; and a prior conviction is 
properly analyzed in light of the law of the jurisdiction where it was 
obtained as well as under the applicable federal law referenced in the 
definition.189 This aspect of immigration law requires careful analysis of 
criminal law by immigration courts that lack jurisdiction over or institu-
tional expertise in criminal adjudication. 
The Supreme Court has in several cases rejected the government’s 
expansive interpretation of the aggravated felony definition. In addition 
to settling some very specific aspects of aggravated felony analysis, 
these cases hint at broader themes about the proper role of immigration 
courts deciding criminal law issues in a civil proceeding. These cases 
show that the Executive Branch is not accorded deference on criminal 
law matters outside its area of expertise. Rather, the Supreme Court 
appears to police the boundaries of the government’s immigration au-
thority based on concerns about criminal procedural protections, state 
sovereignty, federal law uniformity, and due process. The Court’s rul-
ings reflect an overarching concern about the severe immigration con-
sequences that stem from criminal convictions imposed in a process that 
is closely related but procedurally divorced from the original criminal 
proceedings, and which lacks the same protections. The Court’s cabin-
ing of immigration expertise and assertion of traditional judicial over-
sight could prove beneficial to noncitizens. Suspicions about the compe-
tence of immigration courts to handle criminal law issues may also raise 
questions about whether affording noncitizens full criminal procedural 
protections in immigration proceedings would improve outcomes. 
 
 188 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (2010) (noting that Congress has never defined 
the term “moral turpitude”). 
 189 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 5 (2004) 
(describing the Florida statute of conviction and federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 16, referenced in the 
aggravated felony definition) (“The question here is whether § 16 can be interpreted to include 
such [state law] offenses.”). 
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1.     Leocal: Interpreting Federal Criminal Law 
 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that aggravated felony deter-
minations that turn on the meaning of a federal criminal statute must be 
construed in favor of the noncitizen and consistent with other federal 
criminal laws. In Leocal v. Ashcroft190 the Court examined whether the 
petitioner’s Florida felony conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol and causing serious bodily injury was a “crime of violence” 
under 18 U.S.C. § 16, making it an aggravated felony.191 The petitioner 
was a legal permanent resident who had lived in the United States for 
twenty years before his conviction.192 After causing an accident that 
injured two people, he was charged with two counts of felony DUI 
causing serious bodily injury under a Florida statute, pleaded guilty to 
both counts, and was sentenced to prison.193 In subsequent removal 
proceedings, he was found to have an “aggravated felony” conviction 
and ordered removed. 
In Leocal the Court interpreted the “crime of violence” in 18 
U.S.C. § 16 to require a reckless or intentional mental state, rejecting 
the government’s position that it included negligence-based driving 
offenses. “Crime of violence” is defined in the criminal code and refe-
renced in the definition of “aggravated felony.”194 The issue in Leocal 
was whether a conviction under a Florida statute punishing DUI causing 
serious bodily injury is, categorically, a “crime of violence,” namely, as 
an offense that “has as an element”195 or “by its nature, involves a sub-
stantial risk”196 of the “use” of physical force. The Florida statute, like 
many similar state statutes, requires proof of causation of injury, but 
does not require proof of any particular mental state. Some other states 
require proof of negligence.197 In Leocal, the Court construed § 16 to 
require “a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental 
 
 190 543 U.S. 1. 
 191 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining “crime of violence”). 
 192 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 4 (noting that Leocal entered the United States in 1980, became a legal 
permanent resident in 1987, and was convicted in 2000). 
 193 Id. at 3 (citing FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) (2003)). 
 194 See id. at 6 (“18 U.S.C. § 16 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, which broadly reformed the federal criminal code in such areas as sentencing, bail, and 
drug enforcement . . . . Section 16 has since been incorporated into a variety of statutory provi-
sions, both criminal and noncriminal.”); see also id. at 4 (“[8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)] defines 
‘aggravated felony’ to include . . . ‘a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but 
not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one 
year’” (second alteration in original)). 
 195 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006). 
 196 See id. § 16(b). 
 197 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8 nn.5–6. 
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conduct.”198 As a practical matter, the holding in Leocal meant that the 
“crime of violence” definition of aggravated felony does not include 
DUI offenses. 
The statutory analysis in Leocal reflects that the Court interprets a 
criminal statute using core criminal statutory analysis, even in the con-
text of reviewing an immigration decision. This stance explains the 
Court’s rejection of mere negligence as a criminal mental state and its 
repudiation of the notion that “crime of violence” could include such 
common DUI–injury offenses. Criminal law usually demands more, as 
the Court stated: “[W]e cannot forget that we ultimately are determining 
the meaning of the term ‘crime of violence.’”199 The Court reasoned 
that other immigration provisions provided evidence that Congress did 
not intend to include DUI offenses as crimes of violence.200 Though the 
Court found no ambiguity, it noted that 
we would be constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in 
petitioner’s favor. Although here we deal with § 16 in the deporta-
tion context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal and 
noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute con-
sistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or non-
criminal context, the rule of lenity applies.201 
The Court refused to “shoehorn” a DUI offense “into statutory sections 
where it does not fit.”202 
Leocal reinforces that criminal laws are interpreted as such no mat-
ter where they appear. In Leocal, this meant that the immigration statute 
was construed narrowly in favor of a noncitizen in immigration pro-
ceedings. The rule of lenity sounds in a due process–based concern 
about clear notice about the scope of a criminal statute.203 In Leocal, the 
Court’s “ordinary” and “natural” reading of the statute was not merely 
procedural, as it yielded a substantive result: it limited the scope of the 
aggravated felony definition and meant that a class of noncitizens would 
not be subject to permanent exile.204 
 
 198 Id. at 10–11. 
 199 Id. at 11. 
 200 Id. at 11–12. 
 201 Id. at 11 n.8 (citing United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18 
(1992) (plurality opinion), which applied the rule of lenity to a tax statute, in a civil setting, 
because the statute had criminal applications and thus had to be interpreted consistently with its 
criminal applications). 
 202 Id. at 13. 
 203 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (stating that the rule of lenity 
“ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to con-
duct clearly covered”). 
 204 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. 
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2.     Lopez: Uniformly Applying Federal Drug Statutes 
 
The Supreme Court again relied on basic statutory interpretation 
rules in twice rejecting the government’s expansive treatment of prior 
drug crimes as aggravated felonies.205 The aggravated felony definition 
includes any drug trafficking crime “as defined in 18 U.S.C. section 
924(c),” which means “any felony punishable under,” inter alia, “the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. sec. 801, et seq.).”206 In Lopez v. 
Gonzales and Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, the Court held that the 
immigration court’s analysis is restricted to the actual conviction, which 
must be a felony under federal law. As in Leocal, these decisions draw 
on procedural and definitional concepts but have a substantive compo-
nent: by limiting the scope of the aggravated definition, many nonciti-
zens convicted of drug crimes will not be subject to permanent removal. 
In Lopez, a legal permanent resident was convicted in South Dako-
ta of aiding and abetting another person’s possession of cocaine, a felo-
ny under state law.207 Under federal drug laws, mere drug possession is 
not a felony.208 The government asserted that this conduct was nonethe-
less “punishable” under the federal drug laws, albeit as a misdemeanor, 
which was sufficient to deem it an aggravated felony.209 Rejecting this 
reading, the Court held that a state offense qualifies as a “felony punish-
able under the Controlled Substance Act” only if it proscribes conduct 
punishable as a felony under that federal law.210 
To interpret the term “illicit trafficking,” the Court relied on famil-
iar statutory themes of notice, predictability, and uniformity. Harkening 
to its construction of “crime of violence” in Leocal, the Court in Lopez 
relied on an everyday and commonsense reading of the statute: “ordina-
rily trafficking means some sort of commercial dealing,” not mere pos-
session.211 The Court rejected the notion that a federal-law definition 
could depend on the vagaries of state law, a proposition it has carefully 
developed in the criminal-law context. Under the government’s expan-
sive reading, immigration judges’ evaluation of prior convictions would 
turn on state law, not the federal drug scheme explicitly referenced in 
 
 205 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (holding that misdemeanor 
simple drug possession conviction under Texas law that could have, but was not actually charged 
as a recidivist offense, was not a felony under federal drug law); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 
(2006) (holding that South Dakota felony offense of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine 
was not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws). 
 206 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581. 
 207 Lopez, 549 U.S. at 51 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-5 (1988)). 
 208 Id. (holding that the South Dakota felony offense of aiding and abetting possession of 
cocaine was not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws). 
 209 Id. at 53. 
 210 Id. at 60. 
 211 See id. at 53–55. 
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the aggravated felony definition.212 This approach, if adopted, also 
would impact federal sentencing provisions, which rely on the aggra-
vated felony definition for enhancement purposes.213 Federal drug laws, 
not state laws, the Court explained, supply the relevant standard for 
evaluating prior drug convictions.214 If Congress intended to create a 
state-by-state approach, it clearly could have said so.215 
 
3.     Carachuri-Rosendo: Respecting State 
Criminal Convictions 
 
In a second case analyzing a prior drug conviction, the Court held 
that the aggravated felony determination must be based on the immi-
grant’s actual conviction, not the immigration court’s own assessment 
of his criminal conduct.216 In Carachuri-Rosendo, a lawful permanent 
resident who had resided in the United States since he was five years 
old faced permanent deportation in his mid-twenties after conviction on 
two misdemeanor drug possession charges in Texas.217 The first convic-
tion for marijuana possession resulted in a twenty-day jail sentence, and 
the second for possessing one tablet of Xanax without a prescription led 
to a ten-day jail sentence.218 After the second conviction, the govern-
ment initiated removal proceedings asserting that the second conviction 
was an aggravated felony. Though simple drug possession is not a felo-
ny under federal law, it can be charged as a felony if the defendant has 
one or more prior drug convictions.219 In such cases, the government 
must notice and prove the prior conviction, and the defendant has an 
opportunity to challenge its validity.220 In Carachuri-Rosendo, the gov-
ernment argued that a noncitizen’s second possession conviction was 
“punishable” as a felony drug offense because he could have been 
charged federally as a recidivist drug offender.221 The Court rejected 
this reading, holding that because the immigrant’s actual conviction was 
for simple possession and had not been enhanced based on the fact of a 
prior conviction, the conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. 
 
 212 Id at 55–56. 
 213 Id. at 58. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 59 (highlighting that injecting a state law analysis would yield untoward results 
depending on the harsh or lenient treatment of drug possession offenses under different state 
laws). 
 216 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2580. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 2587–88 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a), 851 (2006)). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
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Carachuri-Rosendo, like Lopez and Leocal before it, underscores 
the Court’s role in statutory interpretation of aggravated felonies provi-
sions and seems to caution against expansive interpretations. The 
Court’s analysis in Carachuri-Rosendo focused on three points: the 
statutory text of the immigration law, the actual record of conviction, 
and the general rule of lenity applied to ambiguities in criminal statutes, 
including those that are referenced in immigration laws. In Carachuri-
Rosendo, the Court began by giving the statutory terms a “common-
sense” and “everyday understanding” of the term “aggravated felony” 
and its reference to felonies punishable under federal drugs laws.222 The 
Court rejected the government’s “unorthodox” position (of treating a 
petty possession charge as an aggravated felony), saying it “did not fit 
easily into the everyday understanding” of a recidivist drug possession 
offense.223 The Court emphasized that the statutory text refers to a per-
son “convicted of a[n] aggravated felony,” requiring that “the convic-
tion itself is our starting place, not what might have or could have been 
charged.”224 Here, the record contained no finding of the fact of his 
prior drug offense.225 
The Court interpreted the aggravated felony definition in a manner 
consistent with the federal drug laws.226 The same conduct would have 
yielded a misdemeanor sentence under the federal sentencing guide-
lines, and the government could not produce one example of similar 
conduct having ever been the basis for a felony recidivist charge in fed-
eral court.227 In terms of statutory interpretation, the Court rejected the 
government’s expansive definition of a criminal statute against an alien, 
stating that “ambiguities in criminal statutes referenced in immigration 
laws should be construed in the noncitizen’s favor. And here the critical 
language appears in a criminal statute.”228 
Carachuri-Rosendo also makes clear that immigration courts mak-
ing aggravated felony determinations are not criminal courts in the first 
instance. Rather, their task is a purely legal one: deciding the legal sig-
nificance of a conviction. In this task, the record of that state or federal 
conviction binds the immigration court. Importantly, this is a reminder 
that immigration courts are not adjudicating guilt or imposing sentence 
and must respect the decisions of state and federal prosecutors in charg-
ing and resolving criminal cases.229 The immigration court “cannot, ex 
 
 222 Id. at 2585 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)). 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 2586. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 2589 (“It seems the Government’s argument is inconsistent with common practice in 
the federal courts.”). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006)). 
 229 Id. at 2586–88. 
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post, enhance the state offense of record just because facts known to it 
would have authorized a greater penalty under either state or federal 
law.”230 Hence, the immigration court was powerless to attach immigra-
tion consequences to a state court conviction based on facts that could 
have authorized (but in fact did not) a higher penalty under state or fed-
eral law.231 
In addition to comporting with the statute, constraining the immi-
gration court’s role also accords respect to the state-court conviction. 
The Court accorded “great significance” to the procedural safeguards 
required for a federal recidivist drug possession offense, which require 
notice, proof, and an opportunity to challenge the prior conviction, and 
reflect the important role of prosecutorial discretion.232 The govern-
ment’s suggestion that such procedures could be satisfied in immigra-
tion court was rejected.233 The prosecutor’s decision to pursue a recidiv-
ist enhancement, the Court explained, is equivalent to a charging 
decision, i.e., it is not automatic but a calculated choice by the prosecu-
tor, which must be afforded deference.234 In this particular case, the 
record showed “the prosecutor specifically elected to ‘abandon’ a reci-
divist enhancement under state law.”235 Allowing immigration judges to 
apply recidivist enhancements that were not part of the original convic-
tion would “denigrate the independent judgment of state prosecutors to 
execute the laws of those sovereigns.”236 
Confining aggravated felony determinations to the record of con-
viction protects immigrants who have negotiated criminal cases to avoid 
certain deportation consequences. Noncitizens seek to resolve criminal 
cases to avoid or minimize immigration consequences. As the Supreme 
Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, “changes in our immigration 
laws have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal con-
viction.”237 The Court in Padilla stated that “deportation is an integral 
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that 
may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes.”238 In Padilla, the Court recognized that criminal defendants 
have a right to effective assistance of counsel about risk or certainty of 
deportation as a consequence of conviction.239 The threat of deportation 
is a “powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not 
 
 230 Id. at 2586 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S 224, 247 (1998) (holding 
that fact of recidivism is not an element of the offense requiring a right to jury trial)). 
 231 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2586–87. 
 232 Id. at 2588. 
 233 Id. at 2587–88. 
 234 Id. at 2588. 
 235 Id. (citing to state court judgment). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 1486. 
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mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal that does.”240 Plea 
agreements are contracts enforceable against the government.241 This 
value would be lost, however, if the immigration court could assert its 
own view of how the noncitizen’s conduct could have been prosecuted 
under federal law, as the government urged in Carachuri-Rosendo. The 
Court’s insistence that the immigration court’s aggravated felony in-
quiry is limited to the record of conviction ensures that the plea nego-
tiated and the record created in criminal court is honored in subsequent 
immigration proceedings. This is especially critical because while the 
noncitizen has appointed counsel in criminal proceedings, he may not 
have counsel in subsequent immigration proceedings to adjudicate the 
immigration consequences. 
By strictly construing criminal law statutes, the Supreme Court has 
cabined immigration courts’ leeway in adjudicating aggravated felonies. 
In Leocal, Lopez, and Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court rejected the gov-
ernment’s expansive application of the aggravated felony definition. In 
these cases, the Court’s role as the arbiter of statutory interpretation is 
multifaceted: ensuring predictability and uniformity, resolving statutory 
ambiguities in favor of the noncitizen, and respecting the separation of 
criminal and immigration courts in terms of their function and sovereign 
interests. These themes reinforce that while immigration consequences 
are integral to the criminal process, these processes remain distinct. 
Through judicial oversight, the Court monitors that immigration courts 
stick to their proper, limited role. 
These criminal immigration cases have procedural and substantive 
effects. Due process typically involves alleged process deficiency. In 
Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court limited the process that the immigration 
court could undertake, insisting that its analysis was limited to state-
court record of conviction and rejecting the notion that it could address 
procedural deficiencies in the underlying conviction by providing pro-
cedures in immigration court.242 Such process restrictions on immigra-
tion courts highlight that criminal and immigration court processes are 
not interchangeable. It also limits substantively the scope of the aggra-
vated felony conviction. As a result of Lopez and Carachuri-Rosendo, 
many low-level drug offenses do not qualify as aggravated felonies. 
 
 240 Id. 
 241 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (holding that when prosecutor 
breaches the plea agreement, defendant is entitled to remedy of specific performance to enforce 
the contract), cited in Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009). 
 242 Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2587–88 (2010). 
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III.     IMMIGRATION LAW ON ITS OWN PATH 
 
The Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence provides a judi-
cial framework based in due process for developing broadly applicable 
procedural protections for noncitizens in immigration court. This ap-
proach builds on firm ground: it is well established that noncitizens in 
immigration proceedings are entitled to due process and that courts re-
view due process issues arising in immigration proceedings.243 In immi-
gration law, procedural due process has served an important judicial 
check on Congress’s plenary authority on immigration matters.244 But 
due process analysis has not yielded in immigration proceedings the 
kind of standard procedural protections that have evolved under the 
Sixth Amendment in criminal proceedings. This gap in procedural pro-
tections is partially explained by the classification of immigration law 
as civil, not criminal.245 Perhaps more important, a hallmark of due 
process analysis in both the civil and criminal contexts is that it is flexi-
ble and generally turns on a case-by-case analysis of the facts.246 
Many criminal procedural rights are rooted in due process, includ-
ing the right to counsel,247 safeguards against involuntary confes-
sions,248 the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof,249 and the 
right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence.250 Some of these criminal 
procedural rights evolved in the shadow of the Sixth Amendment, 
 
 243 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 244 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1665–71 (discussing cases in which procedural due 
process operated as a substantive check on Congress’s authority, for example, to limit statute 
mandating detention for an entire class of aliens). 
 245 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1307–08 (addressing classification of immigration law as civil, 
not criminal, and differing approaches to procedural rights in civil and criminal law). 
 246 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing pre-Miranda 
confession analysis under the due process clause as “‘judicial’ in its treatment of one case at a 
time,” and “flexible in its ability to respond to the endless mutations of fact presented”). 
 247 Before the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was made applicable to the states, see Gide-
on v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), right-to-counsel claims were evaluated as due process 
claims under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that 
failure to appoint every indigent defendant accused in a state criminal prosecution did not neces-
sarily violate due process); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that failure to ap-
point counsel in a capital case violated due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 248 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688–89 (1993) (“[O]ver the course of 30 years, 
beginning with the decision in Brown v. Mississippi, we analyzed the admissibility of confessions 
in such cases as a question of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 249 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
 250 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[S]uppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is materi-
al either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
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which was not applied to the states before its gradual incorporation un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment during the 1960s.251 Apart from such 
specific rights, courts analyze whether particular factual circumstances 
amount to a due process violation.252 For example, involuntary confes-
sions violate due process, and the Court’s analysis of them is fact spe-
cific, flexible, and case-by-case.253 The requirement of Miranda warn-
ings was a departure from constitutional due process analysis of 
involuntary confessions because it created prophylactic rules based on a 
presumption that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.254 The 
Miranda rules anticipated the recurring, foreseeable problem of invo-
luntary confessions and created a presumptively constitutional safe har-
bor for police interrogations that would likely withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. 
In all procedural due process analysis lies the risk that the deficient 
proceeding is unfair and unreliable. In the context of coerced confes-
sions, for example, the Supreme Court has articulated concerns about 
inappropriate state action, for example, torturing a suspect until he con-
fessed, and the reliability of a coerced confession.255 In the civil realm, 
accuracy is an explicit factor under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing 
test used to evaluate procedural due process claims by weighing three 
factors: the private interest that will be affected by official action, the 
risk of an erroneous result, and the probable value of additional proce-
dural safeguards.256 
 
 251 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.12 (2010) (summarizing history of 
incorporation of Bill of Rights on states); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 2.7(b) (3d ed. 2010) (observing that in some areas, “the Court's post-incorporation rulings 
initially relied on due process and subsequently turned to a specific guarantee as an alternative 
grounding for imposing basically the same constitutional limitations”). 
 252 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 251, § 2.7(a) (providing examples of due process–based crimi-
nal procedural protections). 
 253 Id. § 6.2(c) (describing due process analysis of confessions). 
 254 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (referring to the “inherently compelling 
pressures” of “in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime”); see also 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (“In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance 
on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary 
custodial confession, a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is of-
fered in the case in chief to prove guilt.” (citation omitted)). 
 255 See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484–85 nn.12–13 (1972) (observing that while 
coercion is the touchstone of due process analysis of confessions, trustworthiness of the confes-
sion has been an abiding concern) (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 385–86); see also 2 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 251, § 6.2(c) (describing prohibited tactics to obtain confessions). In 
due process analysis of identifications, reliability is a primary concern. See United States v. Crew, 
445 U.S. 463, 473 n.19 (1980) (“[T]he ‘independent source’ test of United States v. Wade and 
Stovall v. Denno . . . seeks only to determine whether the in-court identification is sufficiently 
reliable to satisfy due process . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 256 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Markowitz, supra note 3, at 
1352–55 (proposing how the factors in Mathews v. Eldridge might be adapted to create more 
protective procedural protections in immigration proceedings). 
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In immigration law, accuracy, fairness, and the risks attached to 
prejudicial error are compelling concerns. The government processes a 
huge number of cases every year, in a bureaucracy that is overwhelmed 
and understaffed. The government’s high reversal rate on legal issues in 
the appellate courts and at the Supreme Court indicates that the risk of 
error is high. The risk of harm from those errors is extreme because a 
deported aggravated felon cannot legally return to this country and may 
face actual harm—even torture or death—as a result of an erroneous 
legal decision to remove them. These concerns support the need for 
additional procedural safeguards under Mathews. Indeed, in the immi-
gration context, the Court has signaled a willingness to safeguard judi-
cial review, check aggressively broad statutory interpretation, and create 
broadly applicable procedural rules to avoid due process concerns.257 
The six-month detention rule in Zadvydas is significant in that it applied 
generally to a class of cases, namely, all post-removal detention pro-
ceedings.258 The Court justified its six-month rule as necessary to pro-
vide the agency leeway in executing removal decisions, while still com-
plying with constitutional due process norms.259 Similar reasoning 
could support judicially developed, standardized procedural rights in 
immigration proceedings. 
Unlike the Sixth Amendment pathway, rights developed under the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause need not depend on categoriza-
tion of immigration proceedings as “criminal.” The Court’s decision in 
Padilla suggests that the civil–criminal labels are “ill-suited” to ques-
tions of permanent deportation based on criminal conviction. Getting 
courts to recognize that immigration proceedings are sufficiently crimi-
nal to fall within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment may prove difficult. 
Even if the Sixth Amendment were held to apply to immigration cases, 
there would remain serious questions about how it would apply and 
whether Sixth Amendment protections would sufficiently protect nonci-
tizens in removal proceedings. Traditionally, when the Supreme Court 
has incorporated a federal constitutional right to make it applicable to 
states, the right has been applied co-extensively in federal and state pro-
ceedings. Because state and federal criminal prosecutions are essentially 
parallel systems, adapting new constitutional standards is not a difficult 
task, at least in theory. In contrast, immigration proceedings are distinct 
and importing Sixth Amendment procedures might pose some chal-
lenges. For example, Sixth Amendment protections are offense specif-
 
 257 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684–87 (2001). 
 258 Id. at 699–701 (reasoning that the rule would “recognize some presumptively reasonable 
period of detention” and “limit the occasions when courts will need” to rule on the legality of 
detention in individualized cases”). 
 259 Id. at 700. 
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ic260 and only apply to felonies and misdemeanors involving a loss of 
liberty.261 Because these features of criminal law have no clear analogs 
in immigration court, application of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in immigration cases would require new rules. 
Pursuing the Fifth Amendment pathway dispenses with these ques-
tions and allows courts to innovate rights, borrowing from the Sixth 
Amendment as needed, and retooling it to fit the immigration context 
when necessary without fear of implication for the criminal context. 
This flexibility also allows courts to craft rights that would be more 
protective than their Sixth Amendment counterparts. Greater protection, 
greater flexibility, and greater speed in adoption (because they build on 
a framework already established by the Supreme Court) are three strong 
reasons to pursue a Fifth Amendment based strategy towards establish-
ing more protection of noncitizens in immigration court. 
Two areas ripe for innovation in immigration proceedings are dis-
covery and the right to counsel. Both are critically important to improv-
ing the fairness and accuracy of the agency proceedings and would faci-
litate more efficient and meaningful judicial review. The following 
discussion examines constitutional discovery and the right to counsel as 
they apply in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment and shows 
how comparable, or even more protective, rights could be applied in 
immigration proceedings relying on the due process motivated frame-
work described in Part II. 
 
A.     Discovery 
1.     Constitutional Discovery in Criminal Court 
 
Consider the issue of discovery in the criminal and immigration 
contexts. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to discovery 
that entitles him to material exculpatory and impeachment evidence in 
the possession of the prosecution or its agents even without a request.262 
 
 260 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001) (stating that “the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is ‘offense specific,’” meaning that it attaches only to those offenses for which the defen-
dant has been formally charged, and not to “other offenses ‘closely related factually’ to the 
charged offense”). 
 261 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the right to counsel to all mis-
demeanor state proceedings in which there is a potential loss of liberty). 
 262 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that due process requires prosecutors 
to “avoi[d] . . . an unfair trial” by disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused that is material 
either to guilt or to punishment); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995) (“[T]he 
state’s obligation under Brady . . . turns on the cumulative effect of all . . . evidence suppressed 
by the government . . . .”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112–13 (1976) (holding that the 
defense need not request exculpatory evidence under Brady); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
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This right to Brady evidence is a powerful tool for defendants, which in 
aid of the truth seeking process of trial represents a departure from a 
purely adversarial model.263 While the right is grounded in due process, 
it serves the defendant’s right to a fair trial.264 The right is limited in 
important respects, as the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to 
share all useful information with the defendant.265 Rather, the prosecu-
tor only must disclose “material” evidence, which is favorable to the 
accused and, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair tri-
al.266 To prove a constitutional discovery violation under Brady and its 
progeny, the defendant must show that there is a “reasonable probabili-
ty” that the prosecution’s disclosure of the suppressed evidence would 
have led to a different result.267 
One significant critique of this rule is that it relies on the prosecu-
tor as a gatekeeper to decide which favorable evidence to disclose. Un-
der Brady and it progeny, the prosecutor decides what evidence is fa-
vorable to the defense and whether such evidence is “material.”268 
While the Supreme Court has encouraged prosecutors to err on the side 
of disclosure,269 the prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable evidence is 
adverse to his own litigation interests.270 Justice Marshall, in his dissent-
ing opinion in Bagley, argued that the prosecutor should be required to 
disclose any favorable evidence, leaving it to defense counsel and the 
trier of fact to ascertain its value.271 But this is not the law, which pro-
 
150, 154 (1972) (holding that exculpatory evidence under Brady includes impeachment evi-
dence). 
 263 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (“By requiring the prosecutor to 
assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a pure 
adversary model.”). 
 264 See id. at 675 (“The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.”); see also 
United States v. Ruiz, 526 U.S. 622, 627 (2002) (citing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution and discussing the right to a fair trial); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433–34 (referring to 
due process and fair trial). 
 265 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)) 
(“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”). 
 266 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (stating that exculpatory evidence is evidence the suppression of 
which would “undermine confidence in the verdict”); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675. 
 267 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (“A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly 
shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of 
the trial.’”) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). 
 268 Id. at 437 (stating that constitutional discovery accords “a degree of discretion” to the 
prosecution, “which alone can know what is undisclosed” and requires it “to learn of any favora-
ble evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the 
police”). 
 269 Id. at 440 (“The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not therefore be discouraged.”). 
 270 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[As the prosecutor] he must make the 
often difficult decision as to whether evidence is favorable, and must decide on which side to err 
when faced with doubt. In his role as advocate, the answers are clear. In his role as representative 
of the state, the answers should be equally clear, and often to the contrary.”). 
 271 Id. at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“After all, favorable evidence indisputably enhances 
the truth-seeking process at trial. And it is the job of the defense, not the prosecution, to decide 
whether and in what way to use arguably favorable evidence.”). 
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vides for much narrower discovery and may result in the prosecutor’s 
suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant. Indeed, media re-
ports have highlighted instances in which Brady violations have contri-
buted to wrongful prosecution and convictions.272 
Another significant limitation on constitutional disclosure is that it 
may not apply when a defendant pleads guilty. The Court held in United 
States v. Ruiz that the government is not constitutionally required to 
disclose material impeachment evidence before the defendant pleads 
guilty.273 The Court reasoned in Ruiz that “impeachment information is 
special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a 
plea is voluntary.”274 The Court could extend the same rule to the pre-
plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence, though it has not addressed the 
issue.275 The Court has treated impeachment and exculpatory evidence 
as equivalent for Brady purposes.276 Since ninety-five percent of all 
criminal convictions are obtained by guilty plea, the absence of consti-
tutional discovery in some or all guilty plea cases impedes the flow of 
favorable evidence to the accused or the trier of fact.  
Applying a Brady-type constitutional discovery rule in immigra-
tion court would offer some advantages. The agency trial attorney 
would be required to review government files and disclose any “materi-
al” exculpatory evidence. Since criminal guilt is not the issue, the “ma-
teriality” standard would need to be adapted to immigration law and, for 
example, could cover any evidence that, alone or in conjunction with 
other evidence, might reasonably affect the outcome of the removal 
proceeding. Such a constitutionally mandated disclosure rule in removal 
proceedings could be extremely helpful to noncitizens, who currently 
rely on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, limited discovery, 
and their own investigation to gather helpful information.277 At the 
same time, this constitutional discovery rule, if directly imported from 
criminal law, is deeply flawed, thus limiting its utility in immigration 
 
 272 Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 847 (2010) (citing examples). 
 273 536 U.S. at 630 (the government is not constitutionally required to disclose material im-
peachment evidence before the defendant pleads guilty). 
 274 Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 954–55 
(2008) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629). 
 275 Id. at 955. 
 276 Id. 
 277 See Regina Germain, Putting the “Form” in Immigration Reform, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1145, 1146 (2007) (observing that the few discovery rules that exist relate to prehearing state-
ments, subpoenas, and depositions, and “[t]here is no routine procedure for the government to 
turn over any prior statements to immigration officials or for access to information contained in 
previous filings with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service”); see also Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)); 
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006)); 8 
C.F.R. §§ 103.8, 103.9, 103.10 (2011) (FOIA regulations); id. § 103.20–103.36 (Privacy Act 
regulations). 
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court. It would vest the disclosure decision in agency counsel and po-
tentially deprive the immigration judge, the noncitizen facing removal, 
and the appellate court’s review valuable evidence and information re-
levant to the legal issues and discretionary decisions affecting the out-
come of the case.  
 
2.     Discovery in Removal Proceedings 
 
Now consider the facts in Dent v. Holder, in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized that a person in removal proceedings is statutorily en-
titled to a copy of his or her alien file.278 In Dent, the court established a 
broad statutory disclosure rule relying on the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance to prevent serious due process violations. Consistent with the 
blueprint outlined in Part II, the statutory disclosure rule in Dent is a 
prophylactic rule, based on an existing immigration statute, designed to 
avoid foreseeable, repeat due process concerns, for the protection and 
benefit of a broad class of noncitizens in immigration proceedings. This 
rule is broader than constitutional discovery afforded criminal defen-
dants because it entitles the noncitizen to all documents within the gov-
ernment’s control, not merely those that the government deems impor-
tant and helpful. And here, the aim of the disclosure rule is tailored to 
immigration proceedings: to aid the immigration courts in developing 
the record, especially for pro se litigants, and to facilitate judicial review 
on appeal to the federal circuit courts of appeals. 
 
a.     Dent Was Denied Access to His File 
in Immigration Proceedings 
 
Sazar Dent was charged in removal proceedings with being an 
alien and having an aggravated felony conviction. He had previously 
been convicted of narcotics possession and escape in the third degree in 
Arizona and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment.279 The thirty-
seven-year-old Honduran native had lived in the United States for over 
two decades (since 1981) and the government alleged that he was a le-
gal permanent resident, but not a citizen.280 At a removal hearing, Dent 
claimed that he was a naturalized U.S. citizen because an American 
citizen had adopted him as a child.281 The immigration judge, who knew 
nothing about Dent’s adoption, continued the hearing so that Dent could 
 
 278 Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 375 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 279 Id. at 367. 
 280 Id. at 368. 
 281 Id. He also argued that his escape conviction was not an aggravated felony. Id. 
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provide his adoption papers.282 After he did, the government objected 
that Dent had failed to prove that his mother was a U.S. citizen.283 Una-
ble to locate his now-deceased mother’s birth certificate, Dent explained 
in a letter to the immigration judge the circumstances of his adoption 
and his inability to obtain his mother’s birth certificate or passport. The 
government already had this information, he said, but was still requiring 
him to prove it.284 Unsatisfied, the immigration court rejected Dent’s 
citizenship claim, found him an aggravated felon, and ordered him re-
moved to Honduras. On appeal to the BIA, Dent asked for help in get-
ting documents relevant to his citizenship claim, but he got no re-
sponse.285 Dent was deported to Honduras. 
In his federal appeal, Dent claimed that his due process rights were 
violated because the government possessed documents relating to his 
citizenship claim that it failed to disclose in removal proceedings. 
Dent’s federal appeal had been delayed several years due to agency 
error.286 In the interim, Dent had returned to the United States, and was 
prosecuted for illegal reentry.287 During the criminal prosecution, which 
was eventually dismissed, Dent was represented by counsel and ob-
tained documents from his Alien file, or “A-file,” that he had never seen 
before.288 These documents included a naturalization application Dent’s 
adoptive mother had filed on Dent’s behalf in 1982 when Dent was 
fourteen, and an Application to File Petition for Naturalization Dent had 
filed on his own behalf in 1986, when he was eighteen. These docu-
ments, which appeared not to have been adjudicated, had always been in 
the government’s control, but were never given to Dent in the removal 
proceedings.289 Dent claimed that the government’s failure to disclose 
these documents in removal proceedings violated due process. 
 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 369. 
 284 Id. (telling the immigration judge in his letter, “[s]o I know that the government really 
knows that she was a U.S. born citizen”). 
 285 Id. at 372. 
 286 Id. at 370. 
 287 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006)). 
 288 See id. at 368 (“An A-file is the file maintained by various government agencies for each 
alien on record. ‘Contents include, but are not limited to passport, driver’s license, other identifi-
cation cards, and photographs; immigration history (prior record); and all documents and transac-
tions’ relating to the alien.” (quoting U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., INS DE-
TENTIONS OPERATIONS MANUAL (2000), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-
standards/pdf/defin.pdf)). 
 289 Id. at 370. 
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b.     The Court Construes a Disclosure Statute 
to Require A-file Disclosure 
 
Citing due process concerns and constitutional avoidance, the court 
in Dent relied on a disclosure statute to establish a broad right of access 
to relevant documents for every person on removal proceeding. Though 
the court’s analysis hews to the problem at hand, namely, accessing 
information from the government A-file, the court’s approach reflects 
broader themes about judicial review and oversight and the need for 
procedural standards to prevent foreseeable due process violations, and 
facilitate adequate judicial review. 
The key in Dent was the so-called “mandatory access law,” which 
the court relied on to develop a broad due process–based discovery 
rule.290 By its terms, the statute requires aliens to prove lawful presence 
in the United States “by clear and convicting evidence.”291 In order to 
meet this burden of proof in removal proceedings, “the alien shall have 
access” to his entry document “and any other records and documents, 
not considered by the Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to 
the alien’s admission or presence in the United States.”292 While this 
broad language would appear to include the entire A-file and any other 
relevant documents in the government’s control, the government argued 
that disclosure was not required because Dent’s lawful presence was not 
in dispute,293 and he needed first to file a request under FOIA.294 
Voicing due process concerns, the court in Dent relied on the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance to interpret the “mandatory access law” 
broadly. The “doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires us to con-
strue the statute and the regulation, if possible, to avoid a serious consti-
tutional question.”295 The “mandatory access law,” the court said, pro-
 
 290 Id. at 375 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2006)). § 1229a(c)(2) provides: 
(2) Burden on alien 
In the proceeding the alien has the burden of establishing— 
 . . . . 
(B) by clear and convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the 
United States pursuant to a prior admission. 
In meeting the burden of proof under subparagraph (B), the alien shall have 
access to the alien’s visa or other entry document, if any, and any other records 
and documents, not considered by the Attorney General to be confidential, per-
taining to the alien’s admission or presence in the United States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2). 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Brief for Respondent at 40, Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. CA 09-
71987). 
 294 Dent, 627 F.3d at 374. 
 295 Id. (citing Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989)). 
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vides a rule for removal proceedings, and it “would indeed be unconsti-
tutional if the law entitled an alien in removal proceedings to his A-file, 
but denied him access to it until it was too late to use it.”296 The court 
found that Dent’s due process rights had been violated because his A-
file may show that he is in fact a naturalized citizen. The statutory right 
of access established in Dent does not turn on a due process violation or 
a claim of citizenship. The court required the government to hand over 
the A-file in every removal proceeding: “[t]he only practical way to 
give an alien access is to furnish him with a copy,” adding, “[w]e are 
unable to imagine a good reason for not producing the A-file routinely 
without a request.”297 
 
3.     Creating Protective Procedures in 
Removal Proceedings 
 
The access rule in Dent is premised on facilitating judicial review 
and ensuring fundamental procedural fairness for persons in removal 
proceedings. The court was especially concerned about ensuring fair-
ness and developing the record in cases in which the alien is unrepre-
sented and facing deportation. Congress created in § 1229a(c)(2)(B) a 
broad right of access so that noncitizens could meet their burden of 
proof in removal proceedings.298 Requiring a noncitizen to use FOIA to 
access his A-file during removal proceedings could create serious due 
process concerns, and contribute to him losing or foregoing certain 
claims and defenses as a result.299 Such concerns are magnified given 
the consequences facing the noncitizen, namely, certain and possibly 
permanent deportation. The rule in Dent allows similar access as 
FOIA,300 but accomplishes disclosure within the removal process itself. 
This rule not only speeds up disclosure, but also shifts the burden from 
the alleged noncitizen having to make a request (under FOIA) to the 
government having to disclose a physical copy of the file without a re-
quest (under the “mandatory access law”). 
The disclosure rule also facilitates record development, informed 
decision-making at the agency level, and judicial review of legal issues 
in the federal courts. In Dent, the government’s failure to disclose 
 
 296 Id. (“That would unreasonably impute to Congress and the agency a Kafkaesque sense of 
humor about aliens’ rights.”). 
 297 Id. at 375. 
 298 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2006). 
 299 Dent, 627 F.3d at 374 (“It would indeed be unconstitutional if the law entitled an alien in 
removal proceedings to his A-file, but denied him access to it until it was too late to use it.”). 
 300 While FOIA limits access based on statutory exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), 
§ 1229(a)(2) permits access to documents “not considered by the Attorney General to be confi-
dential.” 
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Dent’s A-file meant that the immigration judge was unaware of facts 
relevant to Dent’s citizenship claim, which impeded his “duty to fully 
develop the record.”301 Pro se aliens, the court added, 
often lack the legal knowledge to navigate their way successfully 
through the morass of immigration law, and because their failure to 
do so successfully might result in their expulsion from this country, 
it is critical that the [immigration judge] “scrupulously and conscien-
tiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant 
facts.”302 
The value of judicial review is heightened when, as in Dent, the 
immigration judge is tasked with deciding legal issues not within its 
primary area of expertise, namely, citizenship (as a defense to removal 
proceedings) and an aggravated felony determination applying federal 
criminal law to a state-court conviction. The federal appellate court 
determines citizenship claims asserted in removal proceedings303 and 
reviews aggravated felony determinations de novo. Because reviewable 
legal issues are often part of the removal process, courts have an institu-
tional interest in ensuring that the record before them was fairly devel-
oped. The rule in Dent serves that purpose. 
Importantly, the rule in Dent is broader than constitutional discov-
ery in criminal cases. Under Dent, the government must hand over the 
entire file (except privileged documents). Unlike in criminal constitu-
tional discovery, the government attorney is not tasked with identifying 
which evidence in the file in is favorable and whether it is “material.” 
The Dent rule applies in every case; under current law, criminal consti-
tutional discovery is not clearly required in guilty plea cases—which are 
most cases. Importing criminal constitutional discovery into the immi-
gration context would create the risk that the procedure will be insuffi-
cient to actually protect noncitizens in removal proceedings, facilitate 
informed decision making, and facilitate meaningful judicial review.  
Some might argue that a Brady-type disclosure in immigration 
proceedings would be better than no disclosure requirement at all (other 
than FOIA), as remains the rule in most jurisdictions. Dent offers a dif-
ferent model: one that is more protective, statute-based and grounded in 
due process, tailored to the immigration proceedings, and which max-
imizes the flow of information to those who need it, namely, noncitizens 
and the courts. Criminal defendants should prefer such a rule to Brady. 
 
 301 Dent, 627 F.3d at 374 (citing Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 302 Id. 
 303 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (vesting courts with power to decide nationality claims asserted in 
removal proceedings); id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (authorizing judicial review of legal issues, including 
aggravated felony determinations). 
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B.     Right to Counsel 
 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases is the 
crown jewel of criminal procedural protections and, for good reason, is 
the right most coveted by noncitizens in immigration court. When the 
Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
applying it to the states, it recognized that “lawyers in criminal courts 
are necessities, not luxuries.”304 Because immigration proceedings have 
long been categorized as “civil,” the Sixth Amendment does not apply 
to them. No similar categorical right to counsel exists under the Due 
Process Clause. Instead, the Court has recognized that counsel may be 
constitutionally required in some civil cases to ensure fundamental fair-
ness in light of the private interest at stake and the risk of error.305 No 
general due process right to counsel in removal proceedings has been 
recognized and Congress prohibits the appointment of counsel at gov-
ernment expense.306 Scholars have charted two main pathways for es-
tablishing a right to counsel in removal proceedings. One is to categor-
ize removal proceedings as “criminal” or “quasi-criminal” so that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies.307 The other is to justify the 
appointment of counsel under the civil law test,308 or some blending of 
the two approaches. Practical interventions such as increasing pro bono 
 
 304 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (making the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel applicable to the states). Courts have recognized that lawyers are necessities in immigration 
court as well, due to complexity of the law. See, e.g., Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 
(9th Cir. 2005) (“The proliferation of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been called a 
labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate.”). 
 305 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (holding that appointment of counsel is necessary 
for the transfer of prisoners to mental health facilities); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976) (recognizing a due process right to counsel in civil cases); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 
(1967) (appointing counsel in delinquency proceedings); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. 
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 21 (1981) (holding that appointment of counsel may be required in termina-
tion of parental rights cases). 
 306 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(4)(A) (2006) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented, 
at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice 
in such proceedings.”). 
 307 See Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1314–25 (exploring criminal-civil distinction); Markowitz, 
supra note 8, at 348–50. 
 308 See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1504 (proposing a right to deportation counsel rooted in 
the “deep relationship between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Markowitz, supra note 3, at 
1355–60 (articulating three step analysis adapted from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976), which would support a right to counsel in removal proceedings based on criminal convic-
tion). Scholars have argued for a right to counsel in other immigration proceedings based on the 
noncitizen’s circumstances, see e.g., Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process 
Rights of Mentally Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373, 
400–12 (2011), or specific defenses, like asylum, e.g., Elizabeth Glazer, The Right to Appointed 
Counsel in Asylum Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1157 (1985); John R. Mills et al., “Death Is 
Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 361, 363 (2009). 
TRAUM.33.2 12/19/2011 10:55 PM 
2011]      CONSTITUTIONALIZING IMMIGRATION  543 
assistance to persons in immigration proceedings might provide another 
solution, at least for some.309 
Under the framework developed in Part II, the right to appointed 
counsel should apply categorically to removal proceedings in which the 
noncitizen is charged with having a prior aggravated felony. The pur-
pose here is not to resolve the debate over the proper or exclusive path-
way to achieving the right to counsel. Rather, it is to examine this issue 
using this framework to incorporate unique aspects of doctrine and judi-
cial oversight in the immigration-removal context. 
 
1.     A Right to Counsel in Aggravated 
Felony Cases 
 
Strong reasons support a right to appointed counsel in removal 
proceedings involving an aggravated felony charge. The judicial-review 
framework described in Part II identifies several core themes in the Su-
preme Court’s immigration cases that support this right to counsel in 
this category of cases premised on robust judicial review of statutory 
and constitutional legal issues, the criminal content of aggravated felony 
determinations, and the need for procedures that prevent foreseeable, 
repeat due process concerns while minimizing judicial interference. 
Although federal courts have recognized that due process may require 
the appointment of counsel in individual cases to ensure the fundamen-
tal fairness, such appointments are not common.310 Rather than address 
this issue case-by-case, courts should guarantee the statutory right to 
counsel afforded by Congress by requiring the appointment of counsel 
categorically in aggravated felony cases based on the high stakes and 
criminal law issues involved.311 
Key features of removal proceedings involving aggravated felonies 
highlight due process concerns of liberty and fairness. These include the 
risk of permanent harm from an erroneous legal determination, the 
complexity of that legal determination in many cases, and the burdens 
on access to counsel during removal proceedings. Removal proceed-
 
 309 See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immi-
grant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2008). 
 310 See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 586 (6th Cir. 1975) (“The test for whether 
due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in any given 
case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide fundamental fairness—the touch-
stone of due process.”); see also Escobar-Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294, 1297 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(noting that some immigration proceedings may require the appointment of counsel to comport 
with Fifth Amendment due process requirements). 
 311 “The right to counsel in immigration proceedings is rooted in the Due Process Clause and 
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1362 and 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).” Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 
1100 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that noncitizens were denied statutory right to counsel in removal 
proceedings). 
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ings, though historically regarded as civil, operate as an extension of the 
criminal proceeding that led to conviction. Padilla makes clear that 
immigration consequences are central to the criminal process.312 Lopez 
and Carachuri-Rosendo suggest that interests at stake in an underlying 
guilty plea would be disturbed if the immigration court on its own could 
enhance the immigration consequences that flow from criminal conduct, 
regardless of the actual conviction.313 These cases highlight the gov-
ernment’s penchant for broadly interpreting criminal statutes in the im-
migration context, despite statutory canons requiring leniency. It seems 
unfair that noncitizens have the benefit of counsel in the underlying 
criminal case, but do not have counsel in the subsequent removal pro-
ceeding when the terms and significance of that guilty plea are probed 
and tested in a technical and complex legal analysis.314 
Mandatory detention of aggravated felons burdens the statutory 
right to retained counsel of choice and risks compromising the fairness 
and accuracy of the proceedings.315 Detention, i.e., bodily liberty, is a 
significant concern in any due process analysis,316 and it is mandatory 
for noncitizens charged with removal based on a prior aggravated felo-
ny.317 Further impeding the right to counsel, the government frequently 
either initiates or transfers proceedings to a forum far from the nonciti-
zen’s residence.318 Some scholars have argued that such transfers impli-
cate venue-based due process concerns.319 Transfer and detention signif-
icantly burden the noncitizen’s statutory right to retain counsel of 
 
 312 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
 313 Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2586–88 (2010) (holding actual conviction 
must supply basis for immigration consequences); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) 
(rejecting notion that aggravated felony determination could rest on state classification for con-
duct not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws). 
 314 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (plea agreements are enforceable 
contracts). 
 315 See Biwot, 403 F.3d at 1098 (“The high stakes of a removal proceeding and the maze of 
immigration rules and regulations make evident the necessity of the right to counsel. The prolife-
ration of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been called a labyrinth that only a lawyer 
could navigate.”) (citing Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 316 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from gov-
ernment custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty 
that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). 
 317 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006) (requiring mandatory custody pending removal). Such detention 
is lawful in part because it is temporary and administrative. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 
510, 527 (2003) (rejecting due process challenge mandatory detention of criminal aliens during 
removal proceedings). 
 318 NYIRS Report, supra note 72, at 363 (stating that sixty-four percent of noncitizens de-
tained in New York are transferred to far-off detention centers, most frequently in Texas, Louisi-
ana, and Pennsylvania). 
 319 See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee 
Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKE-
LEY LA RAZA L.J. 17 (2011). 
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choice320 or access to free legal services. In some remote areas, legal 
services are simply unavailable. It may be impracticable or infeasible 
for retained counsel to represent a client who has been moved to another 
part of the country. Though the quality of retained counsel in immigra-
tion proceedings is a perennial concern,321 recent figures suggest having 
counsel dramatically increases a noncitizen’s chance of success in im-
migration proceedings.322 Detention is critical to due process because it 
may burden the noncitizen’s ability to retain counsel or legal assistance, 
his ability to effectively self-represent, and his will to challenge the 
immigration court decision administratively and judicially. 
In making aggravated felony determinations, immigration courts 
adjudicate criminal law issues outside their native institutional area of 
expertise. Courts have long deferred to the Executive Branch on sensi-
tive matters within involving immigration expertise, including whom to 
admit, exclude, or remove from this country. In cases seeking removal 
based on a prior aggravated felony determination, the issues are purely 
legal and do not touch on these sensitive areas of agency expertise. Ra-
ther, the immigration court to must analyze state or federal criminal law, 
as interpreted by state and federal courts, and criminal records. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected on statutory interpretation 
grounds the government’s expansive reading of federal and state crimi-
nal statutes at issue in these cases.323 The legal analysis required in these 
cases can be very complex and has developed circuit-by-circuit.324 Giv-
en the high stakes and the government’s track record on broadly inter-
preting criminal laws in this context, noncitizens would be more pro-
tected if counsel were developing legal arguments on their behalf in the 
immigration court. 
Zadvydas provides a template for prophylactic procedures applied 
categorically to certain groups particularly at risk for due process viola-
tions.325 In Zavydas, the Supreme Court read into the post-removal sta-
 
 320 In criminal cases, denial of the right to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amend-
ment and is structural error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 212 (2006). 
 321 See In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988) (describing elements of due process-
based claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); In re Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (B.I.A. 
2009) (ordering rulemaking on Lozada framework on ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 
removal proceedings). 
 322 See supra note 72. 
 323 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (holding that misdemeanor 
simple drug possession conviction under Texas law that could have, but was not actually charged 
as a recidivist offense, was not a felony under federal drug law); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 
(2006) (holding that South Dakota felony offense of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine 
was not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10–12 
(2004) (holding that absent proof of reckless or intentional mental state, Florida DUI causing 
serious injury was not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and was thus not an “aggra-
vated felony”). 
 324 See García Hernández, supra note 319, at 36. 
 325 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–701 (2001). 
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tute a reasonable detention duration of six months in order to prevent—
not merely to redress—unlawful (indefinite) detention. A primary rea-
son for this was to give the government leeway in effectuating removal 
with minimal judicial oversight. The same rationale can justify the ap-
pointment of counsel in all removal proceedings involving aggravated 
felony charges. These persons are detained. If determined to have com-
mitted an aggravated felony, they will be permanently exiled, and in-
eligible for discretionary relief. Upon return they face enhanced crimi-
nal penalties. In these cases, the aggravated felony determination is a 
critical threshold issue: only if the noncitizen is not an aggravated felon 
does the immigration court advance to its actual area of expertise, 
namely, determining what discretionary relief is available and whether 
to grant it.326 While judicial review of aggravated felony determinations 
remains an important feature, the process would be much more stream-
lined if criminal legal issues were fully vetted by counsel in immigra-
tion court. 
Finally, providing counsel in aggravated felony cases might signif-
icantly affect the government’s charging decisions. If aggravated felony 
cases required the appointment of counsel and other cases did not, the 
government might forego charging an aggravated felony and instead 
litigate whether the noncitizen is entitled to any form of discretionary 
relief. Requiring counsel for the most serious criminals is a judicial re-
sponse that might restore some civil discretionary balance to immigra-
tion law, preserve the aggravated felony charging option, and enhance 
the fairness and accuracy of those proceedings at the agency level and 
on judicial review. 
 
2.     An Incremental Approach 
 
The strength of the due process–based approach is that it is incre-
mental and does not depend on the nettlesome civil–criminal classifica-
tion. The Supreme Court in Padilla recognized that criminal proceed-
ings and their immigration consequences are “enmeshed,” and that for 
noncitizens immigration consequences may drive resolution of the crim-
inal case.327 While the Court characterized immigration proceedings as 
civil, it acknowledged deportation as a uniquely severe and increasingly 
automatic penalty resulting from criminal conviction by noncitizens. 
For the Court in Padilla, the question of whether deportation is a civil 
or criminal consequence was not dispositive to its holding requiring 
appointed counsel to advise criminal clients on the risk of deportation 
 
 326 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1359 (referring to “extraordinarily complicated legal issues” at 
play in determining whether a noncitizen is removal based on a prior conviction). 
 327 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct 1473, 1481 (2010). 
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resulting from plea. Padilla seeds the notion that the Court may in time 
conclude that removal proceedings based on criminal conviction are 
sufficiently criminal to warrant the application of Sixth Amendment 
protections. That does not appear imminent and, arguably, may not pro-
vide the best protection for immigrants. 
An important aspect of the judicial due process–framework is that 
immigration courts are limited by statute and institutionally in what they 
do and this fact justifies judicial oversight. According full Sixth 
Amendment rights in removal proceedings and endowing immigration 
courts with the power to guarantee such rights might radically change 
what it is that immigration courts do and how its decisions are reviewed. 
By statute, immigration courts must consider state and federal criminal 
laws in determining prior aggravated felony convictions. By case law, 
immigration courts are limited in their analysis of a prior conviction to 
the record of conviction and cannot enhance the conviction based on 
their own factfinding or by adding procedural safeguards. By legislative 
design and tradition, the immigration courts possess institutional exper-
tise on sensitive areas of immigration, including whom to charge or 
grant discretionary relief. This discretion bears on whether and on what 
grounds to initiate removal proceedings. Once a person is charged as 
being removable based on an aggravated felony, that determination is 
purely a question of law, reviewable by the courts, and, because it cen-
ters on criminal convictions and law, does not actually involve agency 
expertise. 
Applying the Sixth Amendment wholesale in removal proceedings 
might lay a foundation for expanding the functions immigration courts 
perform and change the nature of judicial oversight. Some have argued 
that immigration consequences should be settled in criminal court in a 
streamlined process that would allow the full vetting of criminal conse-
quences with the assistance of appointed counsel.328 If immigration 
courts could guarantee criminal procedural protections, why not allow 
them to adjudicate underlying criminal conduct and then impose immi-
gration consequences immediately in a single streamlined process? Ra-
ther than simply make immigration proceedings more fair, this result 
might create a “crimmigration” process that bypasses traditional crimi-
nal court altogether. While such a result seems unlikely to occur, the 
point is simply that immigration courts are, well, immigration courts—
courts of limited jurisdiction based on particularized expertise. Their 
authoritative reach should remain limited to what they are competent to 
do. To the extent that their determinations touch upon criminal judicial 
 
 328 Taylor & Wright, supra note 123, at 1175–84 (suggesting efficiencies and advantages of 
streamlining procedure so that criminal sentencing judge would adjudicate immigration conse-
quences of conviction). 
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proceedings or matters, such concerns may be adequately addressed 
through targeted due process protections overseen by courts of law. 
The due process approach is incremental and flexible. This ap-
proach is not inconsistent with the argument that removal proceedings 
in immigration court are criminal in nature. But the due process ap-
proach draws on more than the fact that noncitizens are detained and 
facing severe consequences, with criminal law analysis forming the 
focus of the immigration court’s inquiry. Rather, this framework, anc-
hored in due process and traditional judicial oversight, posits a broader 
stage of institutional actors—immigration officials, local, state, and 
federal prosecutors, and reviewing federal courts interpreting statutes 
consistent with constitutional norms. This approach places courts at the 
center, balancing and respecting institutional actors and ensuring basic 
due process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For noncitizens facing removal for having an aggravated felony 
conviction, the stakes are especially high. Their future turns on a legal 
assessment of their criminal history by an immigration court that has no 
institutional expertise in criminal adjudication or the state or criminal 
law that forms the focus of the inquiry. While courts have long deferred 
to immigration courts on sensitive matters within their expertise, such 
deference does not extend to the immigration court decisions on matters 
of criminal law central to the aggravated felony determination. Rather, 
the robust judicial oversight of such decisions has highlighted the role 
courts play in ensuring that immigration decisions are not at odds with 
federal criminal law, state sovereign interests in criminal prosecution, 
and the procedural protections and negotiated expectations encapsulated 
in criminal guilty pleas. Though additional procedural protections in 
immigration courts are required to better protect noncitizens in removal 
proceedings, it is not clear those protections should be derived from 
Sixth Amendment criminal law. The Due Process Clause better reflects 
the institutional concerns at play and may afford better protection. 
